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INTRODUCTION

The war against terrorism is transforming our bureaucracy, and it is
transforming it badly. Since September 11, the government has mobilized
not just its national security apparatus, but almost all of the myriad units of
the federal civil administrative state to battle against a small and elusive foe.'
Officials like state department of motor vehicles ("DMV") employees and
federal banking regulators have no obvious expertise in counterterrorism.
Nevertheless, in DMVs, the Treasury Department, and many other unlikely
venues, all of the usual indicators of bureaucratic action-rulemakings,
adjudications, licensing, and civil enforcement actions-have been put to
the new and uneasy service of national security. In this Article, we argue that
the vast majority of these civil bureaucratic initiatives in the war against
terrorism suffer from predictable, persistent, and probably intractable
problems.
Everyone agrees that we should fight terrorism. The question is how we
should do it-and who we should use for the job. While the debate over the
war on terrorism thus far has focused on questions of civil liberties and
executive authority, other fundamental questions have been overlooked. For
example, do our civil administrative agencies make effective, efficient foot
soldiers in this war? Or, in transforming our bureaucracy to become a
fighting unit, are we undermining its ability to serve the vital, if more
prosaic, purposes for which it was intended?
A sober reevaluation of the costs and benefits of the approach the
government has taken since September 11 is overdue, particularly in light of
the all-encompassing nature of the administrative anti-terrorism campaign.
Almost every federal department and agency has adopted an anti-terrorism
policy or initiative. The most mundane of state and local agencies have been
asked to transform themselves into security providers and law enforcers.
Pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 ("PATRIOT Act"), 2 passed
shortly after September 11 and recently reauthorized, financial regulators in
the Department of the Treasury have passed rules, engaged in enforcement
actions, and taken3 over American organizations in an effort
to disrupt
4
terrorist financing. Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, 4 immigration
1.
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 710 (2004) (observing that "Al Qaeda

knows no borders, and its operatives wear no uniforms, operating by stealth more often than
they operate openly"); seealso CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE AINTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION, at x (2002) (defining terrorism like that practiced by al Qaeda as "emerging
through non-national, global networks and with aspirations which are likewise distanced from
place and time").
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
3. See infra Part IV (discussing the PATRIOT Act and the financial war on terror).
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adjudicators have been given broad, barely reviewable discretion to make
asylum determinations with an eye to keeping terrorists out of the United
States, and state DMVs have been tasked with new responsibilities for
limiting access to drivers' licenses. 5
In this Article, we survey some of the bureaucratic initiatives taken on
the authority of these two statutes and identify three characteristic problems
with these efforts. 6 These problems test the capacity of the administrative
state, and in doing so, tell us something about how that state works,
especially its efficacy in the context of unconventional, new initiatives.
First, we identify the problem of fit, that is, the problem of using civil
rules to find and deter terrorists-perhaps the quintessential non-civil
actors. Administrative agencies tend to make law in one of two ways: by
creating and enforcing rules of general applicability that govern the public
at large, such as through a tax collection or drivers' licensing regime, or by
extending a benefit in exchange for voluntary cooperation, such as granting
licenses to financial institutions in return for voluntary compliance with
reporting requirements. 7 These typical modes of action are ill suited to
reach terrorists, who can opt out of regimes that depend on voluntary8
participation and who comprise a tiny segment of the public as a whole.
These problems of scale and coverage make the efforts to detect and deter
terrorists very different from customary bureaucratic work. We argue that, as
a result, bureaucracy is almost always unfit to do counterterrorism. 9

4. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (to be codified in
scattered sections of Titles 8 and 49 of the U.S.C.).
5. See infra Part III (discussing the REAL ID Act).
6. In doing so, we study three traditional forms of administration. But perhaps because
of the difficulties of employing traditional administrative procedure to combat terrorism, new
methods of administration have also been employed: networks of domestic and foreign officials
to harmonize and coordinate law-enforcement approaches and privatization of enforcementmobilizing banks for asset freezes and monitoring. Indeed, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has noted,
networks might be one of the more effective ways to determine "how to mesh antiterrorism
legislation to minimize loopholes" in a multilateral world. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER 208 (2004). Accordingly, Part IV.B examines a more networked mechanism of
administration-one that trades on the gathering and exchange of information.
7. James Landis himself noted that the New Deal agencies he helped to design and justify
were focused on "a general social and economic problem which cut across a vast number of
businesses and occupations." JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 116 (1938). And
contemporary observers continue to agree: "Government mandates and rulemaking generally
apply across the board to individuals and businesses within broad categories." THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, TERRORISM: REAL THREATS. REAL COSTS. JOINT SOLUTIONS 24 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2003/NewFrontier/BusRoundtable-cba.pdf; cf
I MAVX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 212 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press
1968) (1944) ("[E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary
compliance ....).

8. See WEBER, supra note 7, at 212.
9. Nor are problems of fit exclusive to the United States. See, e.g., Lorne Sossen, The
Intersection of Administrative Law with the Anti-Terrorism Bill, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM 419-34
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Second, these anti-terrorist measures diminish administrative
effectiveness by going to extraordinary lengths to privilege agency
discretion, thereby reducing agency accountability and, predictably,
resulting in increasingly arbitrary and unreviewable agency action. We call
this the problem of overdiscretion. It is a maxim of administrative law that
the authority delegated to administrative agencies should be paired with
safeguards on the abuse of that authority.'0 Accordingly, administrative
agencies have traditionally operated publicly and *openly and usually
pursuant to a tested and established framework of rules. "1 Agency
rulemaking is governed by requirements for public notice and comment,
while agency adjudication is subject to judicial review or, at a minimum, to
supervision by senior executive branch officials. 1 But the administrative
initiatives against terror routinely reduce what have traditionally been

(R. Daniels et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the relationship between anti-terrorism initiatives and

administrative law in Canada).
10. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1679-81 (1979). In responding to the Administrative Procedure Act,
[Courts have] turned to a number of . . . techniques to control the exercise of
administrative discretion [including] by undertaking a more searching scrutiny of
the substantiality of the evidence supporting agency factfinding and by insisting on
a wider range of procedural safeguards, . . . require[ing] reasoned consistency in
agency decisionmaking . . . [and] demand[ingi a clear statement of legislative
purpose as a means of restraining the range of agency choice when fundamental
individual liberties were at risk.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see alsogenerally 1

KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARDJ. PIERCEJR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4.5, 7.7, 8.5 (3d ed. 1994) (noting the courts' curtailing of

administrative power and strengthening of evidentiary requirements for administrative
investigation).
See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisiti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of
11.
Administrative Law in InternationalInstitutions, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 319 (2005);
Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND.J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 376 (2001) ("The last great movement in U.S. administrative law was

toward increased transparency and participation in government decisionmaking as a means of
achieving a more perfect pluralist democracy."); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 91 (1983) ("Transparency is usually bought at the price of
incongruity or ex ante rulemaking costs."); see also Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets,
Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 1000
(2004) ("Indeed, agencies already seek to improve the objectivity of their analyses by providing
rigid ex ante rules for measuring costs and benefits."). As one author has noted:

[D]elegation of authority endows administrative agents with wide discretion,
discretion that breeds concerns of unaccountability, recklessness, and corruption.
Administrative law is designed to address such concerns by curbing agents'
discretion through the structuring of the decisionmaking process, by providing
procedural transparency and voice to affected groups, and by setting up review
mechanisms including judicial review.
Benvenisiti, supra, at 319.
12.
See5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
13. Id. § 554.
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participatory, reviewable rulemaking or adjudicatory processes to singular
acts of discretion that are often undertaken in secret and are thus effectively
insulated from public view and from judicial, or even supervisory, review.
Furthermore, these measures often place this decision-making authority in
the hands of mid-level or even street-level bureaucrats, such as office
directors in the Department of the Treasury in the case of the terrorist
financing programs, or low-level state employees in the case of the drivers'
license programs created by the REAL ID Act. 1 4 The allocation of discretion
to bureaucrats who are all but insulated from oversight has, at least in the
case of anti-terrorism regulation, become a license for arbitrariness.
Third, anti-terrorism regulation has expanded agency powers to
regulate beyond areas of agency expertise. Since September 11, our
bureaucracy has folded new industries into its regulatory purview and has
adopted new investigative and rulemaking responsibilities-responsibilities
that are often difficult to distinguish from criminal law enforcement. Max
Weber posited that bureaucracies would develop rational and task-specific
areas of expertise. 5 But the new anti-terrorism responsibilities of agencies
have ignored this Weberian maxim. Instead, agencies have been tasked with
uncharacteristic, non-civil responsibilities and have been told to exercise
these responsibilities without supervision. The results have been predictably
inexpert.
As a result of the problems of fit, overdiscretion, and inexpertise,
agencies asked to fight the war on terror consistently miss their targets. In
fact, the fit between bureaucratic methods of regulation and terrorist
patterns of behavior is so poor that civil bureaucrats typically do not even try
to target terrorists directly. Instead, they target proxy groups in the hopes
that somewhere among those proxies, terrorists may be found. The
predictable result has been that these initiatives have burdened proxy
groups, not terrorists. This proxy problem, as we call it, means that the
administrative war on terror overwhelmingly burdens law abiders who
16
willingly participate in civil administrative schemes.

14.

We borrow the term "street-level bureaucrats" from MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL

BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES

(1980), a landmark study

evaluating the policymaking done by the lowest-level government employees, such as the police
or social workers.
15. WEBER, supra note 7, at 17-21 (setting forth the principles of "legal authority with a
bureaucratic staff," which resulted in, inter alia, the "rule bound conduct of official business,"
"specialized training" for government employees, and a "specialized sphere of competence" for
administrators).
16. Of course, it may be that Americans are willing to accept certain levels or types of false
positives-for example, Americans may feel it is worth over-restricting immigration from
countries likely to produce terrorists. But in our efficiency- and effectiveness-oriented analysis of
the bureaucratic war against terror, we find that the level of false positives in these systems is
quite high indeed and that the cost of adapting task-specific civil administration to deal with
terrorists is accordingly much larger than it might, at first blush, seem to be.
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In this Article, we first look at classical and modern theories of the
purpose of administrative law and consider what they have to tell us about
the administrative war on terror. As a matter of scholarship, we think that
the currently ascendant focus on the political choices made by agencies and
by those who delegate authority to them overlooks vital questions of
competence that occupied scholars like Weber and the mid-century legal
process theorists. The conceptualization of administrative law as a political
arena fails to provide us with traction on important questions like whether
administrative law is an appropriate way to pursue counterterrorism.
Because the competence theorists understood that the justification for
administrative action depends on a careful analysis of its prospects for
success, we offer a relatively thick description 7 of four characteristic
initiatives authorized by the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts that exemplify the
project of sending bureaucrats to war. We analyze the costs and benefits of
the mobilization of the broad panoply of administrative process pursuant to
both statutes-rulemakings, enforcement actions, adjudications, and
licensing-to show how the three paradigmatic problems of fit,
overdiscretion, and inexpertise characterize the efforts of the DMVs, the
Citizenship and Immigration branch of the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Treasury Department to implement their new mandates.'
We then consider some possible counterarguments to our thesis: that
agencies are flexible institutions that have promulgated rules that might do
some good, that terrorism is a fearsome prospect worth overrreaction, and
that perhaps the overbreadth of anti-terrorism regulations usefully mobilize
the citizenry. We find these counterarguments wanting.
We conclude with a brief survey of some of the many other initiatives
that agencies have taken since September 11 to prosecute the war on terror
to give readers a sense of the breadth of the phenomenon. And finally, we
offer recommendations about the appropriate place to locate administrative
counterterrorism initiatives. 9

17.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 1 (1973). Geertz posits that

[b]ehavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is through the
flow of behavior-or, more precisely, social action-that cultural forms find
articulation. They find it as well of course, in various sorts of artifacts, and various
states of consciousness; but these draw their meaning from the role they play
(Wittgenstein would say their "use") in an ongoing pattern of life, not from any

intrinsic relationships they bear to one another.
Id.
18. Because some of these problems are more significant in certain examples than in
others, and because in each example they interrelate to some degree, we have taken a contentdriven approach to organizing our discussion within these Parts. Each Part is structured to focus
on the most relevant issues and to maximize the logical flow of the argument. Accordingly, the

order in which we discuss the issues varies from Part to Part.
19.

See infta Part VI.
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Ordinary civil agencies are simply not very effective at fighting
terrorism. Accordingly, combating terrorism should very rarely be the
principal justification for a new administrative initiative, although it is
possible that some narrow terrorism-directed rules-locking cockpit doors,
for example-will make sense. The better course for regulators and
lawmakers, however, is not to look first to a proposed rule's purported effect
on terrorism, but to ask whether the rule promotes an end that furthers the
agency's regulatory responsibilities.' ° If so-if anti-terrorism benefits are
incidental-then the rule may be justified, and the problems we have
identified may be avoided. But if not, then the repurposing of a civil agency
to wage war on terror should be viewed skeptically. In the future, we hope
that congressional oversight committees and senior executive officials will
take the problems of administration seriously before ordering civil agencies
to take on uncomfortable and novel roles as soldiers of counterterrorism.
II.

THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Our critique draws upon the work of classical theorists of administrative
law, such as Max Weber and Henry Hart, as well as more contemporary
commentators such as Colin Diver, who have identified the characteristics
that enable agencies to function effectively: expertise and discretion
bounded by oversight. What these observers understood, and what has been
obscured by the rush to send civil agencies to war, is that a judgment about
the legitimacy of agency action should be bounded not only by questions of
and democratic
political oversight and delegation, transparency,
accountability, but also by a thick view of how agencies actually function, of
their capabilities, and of their structure. In this, our focus is primarily on the
period and process of implementation rather than on the moment or
process of delegation; that is, we assert that a crucial test of agency
legitimacy is agency effectiveness. We stand with Alexander Hamilton, who
posited more than two hundred years ago that "the true test of a good
government is 21 its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration.
Our case studies also stand as a counterpoint, and perhaps even a
challenge, to much of the leading work justifying delegation to agencies,
which tends to focus on political control, rather than capacity, as the

20. In their study of the political development of the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), Dara Kay Cohen and her co-authors similarly conclude that shifting agencies to the
DHS has come at a cost to what they refer to as the agencies' "legacy mandates" and what we
call their "core missions." They conclude, in fact, that this reduction in agency capacity to
pursue their legacy mandates is not merely an unfortunate result of, but a key purpose of,
executive decisions to refocus agency efforts on the war on terror. Data Kay Cohen et al., Crisis
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the PoliticalDesign of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 724
(2006).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library 1941).
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fundamental test of the legitimacy of agency action. Our survey of this
literature thus posits that there has been a transformation from theories of
administration that have based the legitimacy of agencies on their capacity
and expertise to an approach that rests legitimacy on the political process of
agency control. In the scholarship on the administration of the war on
terror, this has meant that most observers have been thinking about divided
government control of the war-fighting executive rather than about the
capabilities of the various independent and executive branch agencies in
helping to fight that war.
A.

EXPERTISE AND DISCRTION IN CLASsICAL THEORY

Classical theorists of public administration evaluated its merit based on
its capacity. Although we admit that legal scholars should tread carefully
when invoking ten-dollar sociologists, we suggest Max Weber as an early
example. Weber, although principally a describer rather than a defender of
modern bureaucratic process, praised the agency as a mechanism for
adopting rationalized, task-specific, expert, and depersonalized approaches
to modern problems and for depoliticizing the task of regulation: "The
needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. The
choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of
administration."" The legal process school that played such an important
role in mid-century administrative law accepted and built upon the
Weberian notion of bureaucratic expertise by focusing its attention on the
competencies and division of authority between courts and agencies." In
this vein, James Landis argued that the purpose of agencies was to provide
expert supervision of the complicated problems and externalities presented
by the modern economy. 24
Expertise alone neither described nor justified the administrative state,
however. Weber and the legal process scholars who followed him also
emphasized the importance of organizational charts and the balance
between discretion and oversight that they signified. To Weber,
bureaucracies characteristically featured systems of supervision and

22.

WEBER, supra note 7, at 223. As Wolfgang Mommsen has explained, in Weber's view,

"[r]ational, consistent, bureaucratic rule based on a division of labor and strictly defined areas
of responsibility was a more effective means of government than all historically successful forms
of the exercise of power," though, of course, Weber was not always sure that this was such a
good thing. WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS 166 (Michael S.
Steinberg trans., 1984).

23. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient,
49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2004) (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
INTRODUCTION TO HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li,lx-lxii (1994); Keith Werhan, The

NeoclassicalRevival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 567, 577-79 (1992)).
24. LANDIS, supranote 7, at 19.
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25

subordination, and few modern administrative scholars would disagree. He
stressed that government functions could only be coordinated and
rationalized on the basis of regular recording and review of decisions and
rules.26 As Dan Tarlock has said: "The great project of modern
administrative law has been to cabin the exercise of agency discretion.
Legal process theorists took a similar view of the importance of organization.
In this vein, Henry Hart declared that "each agency of decision ought to
make those2 decisions
which its position in the institutional structure best fits
8
make.,
to
it
In the United States, judges have provided much of this supervision. In
fact, the study of judicial review of discretionary decisions by agencies is at
the very center of administrative law and has occupied scholars since passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act shortly after World War 11.29 The
prerogative of supervision is also one the courts themselves have jealously
30
guarded.

25.

WEBER, supra note 7, at 217, 221. Weber wrote:
[T]he typical person in authority, the "superior," is himself subject to an
impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his own dispositions and
commands.... [Tihe person who obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated,
only in his capacity as a "member" of the organization and what he obeys only the
law.

Id. at 217. Weber also noted that the bureaucrat is "subject to strict and systematic discipline
and control in the conduct of the office." Id. at 221; see also Robert A. Kagan, Inside
Administrative Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 816, 816 (1984) (noting that many scholars believe that
"only in the corridors and cubicles of the bureaucracy itself, properly organized and managed,
can images of bureaucratic injustice be replaced by administrative adjudication that will
produce a sense of "satisfaction, acceptance, and justice" (quoting JERRY MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATICJUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 15 (1983))).
26. WEBER, supranote 7, at 219. Weber wrote:
Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing,
even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory. . . . The
combination of written documents and a continuous operation by officials
constitutes the "office" (bureau) which is the central focus of all types of modern
organized action.
Id.
27. A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a "Post-Modern" United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1313 (2004); see also Terrence Daintith,
ContractualDiscretion and Administrative Discretion: A Unified Analysis, 68 MOD. L. REV. 554, 576
(2005) (providing a theoretical justification for constraining agencies as a matter of contract).
28. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 426
(1958).
29. Not every theorist agrees, of course. Edward Rubin's new work on Weber rejects a
hierarchical model of the administrative state and posits a more networked approach to
bureaucratic linkage. See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT (2006).
30. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction
and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 751-65 (1992) (noting that courts have a strong
presumption in favor of reviewability); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly Unflagging
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To the New Dealers, court supervision was never meant to be absolute,
but nor was it meant to be perfunctory. Thurman Arnold's preference for
granting agencies relatively unbounded discretion to act in lieu of courts as
task-specific doers of equity1 was rejected by Felix Frankfurter and other
early New Deal scholars, who urged an important role for courts, one that
allocated oversight authority between courts and agencies on the basis of
31
institutional competence.
To be sure, these organizers of authority between courts and agencies
found, as Colin Diver has suggested, that institutional competence may be a
"terribly plastic," and thus all too malleable concept.3 3 Nonetheless, to Diver
we have" to make sense of the
and others, it remains "the only material 34
proper roles of agencies in the government.
Two of the three problems that we think are inherent in sending the
bureaucracy to war-overdiscretion and inexpertise-are accordingly ones
that administrative lawyers will find familiar. By commandeering civil
agencies to pursue terrorists, our government has pushed agencies outside
their Weberian mandate to be rationalized, expert, and ordered. In offering
national security to serve as an unreviewable trump card unfettering agency
discretion, our government has undermined the capability-based
relationship between oversight and discretion that these theorists thought
was important.:

Our claim about fit-which turns on the generality of civil
administration-has not been applied to cases like this one, though we think
it is related to Weber's view that organization would mark much of modern
Obligation: FederalJurisdictionAfter Saudi Basil and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming

2007) (arguing that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has encouraged the exercise of
federal jurisdiction and carefully policed congressional attempts to limit that jurisdiction).
Arnold rejected any fundamental or functional distinctions between the judiciary and
31.
agencies as institutions of governance except insofar as they served the symbolic dimensions of
governance. He also showed little faith in process as a necessary and sufficient means to a
functional administrative state. Rather, he saw procedural doctrines in the same way that a wily,
creative attorney does: as a tool to move a decisionmaker to a desired outcome. Process, form,
and structure were secondary to substantive policy and functional results. Mark Fenster, The
Birth of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L.
REV. 69, 73 (2005).
32. Id. at 124-27. James Landis, for example, argued that "the advantages of specialization
in the field of regulatory activity seem obvious enough" and that "the need for expertness
became dominant." LANDIS, supra note 7, at 23.
Colin S. Diver, Sound Governance and Sound Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1449 (1991)
33.
(reviewing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY,JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKINGJUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990)) (concluding that institutional competence is a particularly appropriate

lens to use when evaluating the choice to regulate through courts or agencies).
34. Id.; see also Jerry Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 405 (1996)
35. Of course, this is not the first time that Congress and the executive have toyed with the
balance of administrative agency expertise, oversight, and discretion in ways that make
administrative law scholars gnash their teeth. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 34, at 405.
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life. To us, and perhaps to him, civil administration is best suited to deal
with the everyday workings of civil society rather than with the extraordinary
acts of small and shadowy criminal enterprises.
B.

THE TURN TOWARDsPoLrIcs AND A WAYFROM CAPACITY

Recently, administrative law academics have not focused on the classic
questions of efficiency and effectiveness in implementation. Rather, their
work has privileged an earlier moment in agency action-the moment of
delegation-and has focused on the question of political interests. While
these are important questions, in our view this movement in the scholarship
has had two problematic effects, at least in the context of national security: it
has tended to ignore the agency's implementation of its delegated authority
and so has tended to distract scholars from the search for good-as opposed
to democraticallyjustifiable-administration.
This shift in perspective might best be exemplified by Richard Stewart's
1975 article on the transformation of administrative law since the New
Deal. 36 Stewart showed how the New Deal revolutionized the purview of
agencies by basing their legitimacy on their role as expert, task-specific
regulators-a role that Weber and the legal process theorists understood 7
But the expertise justification, Stewart argued, had given way to a much
more political conception of an agency's role and to a corresponding
judicial view of agency process as one designed
to represent the varied
•
•
38
interests involved in any form of agency interaction.
Since Stewart, the politicized concept of agency action has informed the
leading scholarly reconceptions of administrative law. As a result, political
theorists have focused their attention primarily on the moment of
delegation and on the battle amongst competing political interests for the
power to define agency goals. Theorists do not agree about where these
competing interests resolve their disputes: the positive political theorists
would probably point to Congress, 39 while the presidentialists would look to
the presidency, and others concerned with the increasing prominence of

36. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
37. See id. at 1671-76 (discussing the traditional role of administrative agencies)
38. Id. at 1760-89
39. Positive political theorists, for example, have conceptualized the chief ways that
Congress might supervise agencies in two ways: through "police patrol" and "fire alarm"
oversight. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 43 (1994) ("Positive political theory describes regulatory policymaking as a part of a
world in which political actors function within institutions rationally and strategically in order
to accomplish certain goals."); see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: PolicePatrols Versus FireAlarms, 28 AM.J. POL. SCI. 165, 165-66 (1984).
40. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 883 (2003) ("[T]he White House clearly has used rulemaking review to put
its own mark on particular agency rules increasingly often over the course of the past two
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privatized alternatives to traditional regulation might point to nonregulatory actors. 4' Stewart himself has been particularly, but not exclusively,
concerned with judicial review. 42
Positive political theorists (mostly, but not entirely, political scientists)
have focused their attention on congressional control of agencies and have
addressed the competence of agencies to act by considering how Congress
would oversee their actions.43 Presidentialists, on the other hand, have cited
the political choices that agencies make with the president and have
characterized agency action as subject to strong presidential control. 44 Still

others have sought to make agencies themselves the center of political
disputes by privatizing the interest group representation process, either
through negotiated regulation 45 or by opening up traditional areas of
administration to contract and bidding by private parties. 46 Stewart himself
decades, and at an accelerated pace during the Clinton administration."); Elena Kagan,
PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV, 2245, 2246 (2001) ("[A]t different times, one
[governmental entity] or another has come to the fore and asserted at least a comparative
primacy in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process. In this
time, that institution is the Presidency. We live today in an era of presidential administration.").
41.
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 7 (1997) (promoting negotiated regulation as a collaborative process producing better
outcomes than rulemaking); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1, 31-42 (1982).
42. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 439-44 (2003) (evaluating administrative law through five different historical approaches,
comparing those approaches to current practice, and noting that each approach takes a
different perspective towards judicial review).
43. For an overview by an administrative scholar, see generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Political
Oversight and the Deteriorationof Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994). McCubbins and his
co-authors, as well as those who have followed them, have tended to conclude that
congressional supervision of agencies is relatively effective. Indeed, they have argued that
administrative procedure, by requiring a certain level of disclosure of agencies, was enacted by a
rational Congress concerned with ensuring the efficacy of fire-alarm-style oversight:
Fire alarm oversight also requires that elected officials, once the fire alarm has
sounded, investigate conflicting claims among constituent groups and an agency.
To undertake this function, elected officials must have ready access to relevant
information .....
The APA helps to ensure that this information is provided
through the openness provisions and the requirement that agencies allow affected
parties to participate.
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 199
(1990).
44. Croley, supra note 40, at 883; Kagan, supranote 40, at 2246.
45. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE LJ. 1445, 1457
(1997). Jody Freeman, supra note 41, at 7, was another recent exponent of "regneg," although
Richard Stewart long ago considered the promise of the concept. See Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A ConceptualFramework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1341
(1981).
46. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE LJ. 389 (2003). See
generallyJody Freeman, Extending PublicLaw Norms Through Privatization,116 HARv. L. REV. 1285
(2003) (noting the trend toward privatization in recent decades).
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has suggested that he now prefers market-oriented solutions to regulatory
problems.47
In our view, this debate addresses only one of the questions that need
be asked when it comes to understanding and critiquing the delegation of
authority to carry out vast counterterrorism agendas to unrelated federal
agencies. While the question of the representation of executive,
congressional, and public interests in the war on terror is important, an
equally important question is not what power is delegated to the agencies,
nor how that power is delegated, but whether the agencies are an
appropriate receptacle for that power. The debate that has dominated
attempts to define administrative law for the past thirty years does not offer
enough traction on that question.
Furthermore, in each of these theories of the administrative state, the
act of administration is conceived descriptively only in a thin way, as a purely
political act. The interest group representation model of agencies viewed
them as task-specific political actors, whose work could be justified only
through the participation of the plurality of interests affected by the charge
given to agencies. 48
To really understand and justify agency tasks, one cannot only focus on
the political aspect of who decides. 49 Discretion is not only a grant of
political power but also a claim to organized competence. Accordingly, it is
crucial to consider whether specific agencies can and do exercise their
discretion successfully to produce competent results.50 Similarly, we should
look at agency capabilities and expertise not merely as an expression of the
competing interests of the represented public, but also as a function of
efficiency and effectiveness.

47. Stewart, supra note 42, at 451 ("Economic incentives are a logical next step .... Rather
than using economic tools to discipline command regulators, [they] eliminate[ ] command
regulation and use[ ] economic instruments to reconstitute the market itself for regulatory
ends.").
48. See, e.g., id. at 442 (noting that by the 1970s, "courts required agencies to address and
respond to the factual, analytical, and policy submissions made by the various participating
interests and justify their policy decisions with detailed reasons supported by the rulemaking
record," resulting in "an 'interest representation' model that seeks to assure an informed,
reasoned exercise of agency discretion that is responsive to the concerns of all affected
interests").
49. See Ronald Krotozynski, Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 739 (2002) (identifying problems with the
"theory of implied delegation, rather than agency expertise, as the foundation of this rule of
deference" that marks modern judicial supervision over agency decisionmaking).
50. As Jerry Mashaw has explained, "[firom the perspective of bureaucratic rationality"-a
perspective that we largely adopt-"administrative justice is accurate decisionmaking carried on
through processes appropriately rationalized to take account of costs." MASHAw, supra note 25,
at 26.
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WAR ON TERROR SCHOLARSHIP: THE PRIVLEGING OFPOLITICS AND RIGHTS

American legal scholarship on the war on terror since September 11 has
focused primarily on the appropriate authority and roles of the executive,
legislature, and judiciary, rather than on the agencies that make up our socalled fourth branch. Many scholars have grappled with the scope of
executive power. 51 Other writers have expressed concerns about postSeptember 11 intrusions on civil liberties52 and explored the effect of the 5de

rights. 3
facto post-September 11 state of emergency on criminal procedure
This focus on unbridled executive power has found a response in Cass
Sunstein's proposal that the most deferential doctrine of administrative law
be used to bridle the executive-at least a little. In Administrative Law Goes to
War, Sunstein asserts that "the logic of Chevron applies to the exercise of
executive authority in the midst of war" and that principles of administrative
54
law can help our governing institutions divide the powers to make war.
Thus, Sunstein is engaged in a different inquiry than ours: he is focusing on
the military war in Iraq and the President's powers to make it, whereas here
we confront the question of how our government will use its bureaucracy to
the end of fighting the far more loosely defined and potentially
55
interminable war on terror.

51. As in, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele's critique of "ever-expanding"
exceptionalism, justifying executive overreaching during a time of perceived national
emergency. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2004). Rosa Brooks made a related
indictment of unbounded executive claims to emergency powers as claims of "war everywhere,"
even, we assume, in the traditional administrative state. Brooks, supra note 1, at 704.
See generally DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
52.
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002).

53. See John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=806384;
Scheppele, supra note 51, at 1052 ("There is also a sign that terrorism investigations have been
increasingly using methods that no longer require regular Fourth Amendment judicial
warrants."); WilliamJ. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2142-60 (2002).
54. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2264 (2005).
Sunstein is concerned specifically with certain non-delegation questions raised by Jack
Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley in their recent article on the constitutional- and international-law
bases of the war against terrorism. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV 2047 (2005). In their

article, Bradley and Goldsmith argue that "[a]lthough nondelegation concerns should not play
a significant role in interpreting the AUMF, a clear statement requirement is appropriate when
the President takes actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the
United States." Id. at 2047.
55. Nonetheless, this paper suggests that civil-administration and war-making powers coexist uneasily at best. We should be cautious, then, in assuming that the Chevron framework is
the right one to use in analyzing war-making authority. Although Sunstein supposes that "[i]n
war no less than peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined
if it is undertaken with close reference to standard principles of administrative law," it is by no
means clear that the rules of bureaucracy will be well-suited to decisions prompted by needs of
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Similarly, some of those who have weighed in on the role of the
judiciary in the war on terror have tackled the relationship between courts
and executive agencies, while others have theorized about the appropriate
role for courts in terror regulation through tort. 56 In the administrative
context, some of our colleagues have focused on particular problems that
various agencies have faced when tasked with terror-fighting responsibilities,
ranging from agency-by-agency critiques to broader concerns about
subverting principles of open governance. 57 Finally, some of our colleagues
have applied theories of bureaucratic structure to the political process by
which the Department of Homeland Security was created, critiquing the
effects of this massive administrative reorganization. 5s
But these task- and issue-specific critiques address parts of the elephant.
The broader question-the one addressed in this Article-is how the
government should be mobilized to fight terrorism. Currently, it is a multifront effort, including prosecutors, spies, and soldiers. We ask whether civil
bureaucrats should be added to the list of fighters, not as a matter of
individual rights or government powers, but as a matter of capabilities.
Although these other questions are important, they can be answered only
with an understanding of what the civil bureaucracy is actually capable of
performing. We consider how the civil administrative state has performed in
the war on terror in the next two Sections by examining how administrators
have implemented two important statutes passed after September 11.
III.

THE REAL

ID ACT: ANTI-TERRORISM

THROUGH ADJUDICATION

In May 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act,5 9 legislation intended

to "prevent another September 11-type terrorist attack by disrupting terrorist
travel." 60 Here, we focus on the two central aspects of the REAL ID Act that
security, as the sorts of regulation that bureaucratic rules try to do are a bit different. Sunstein,
supra note 54, at 2672.
56. See generally Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1061 (2005); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstractid=461721. While tort suits by victims constitute a form of regulation, they are
outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on the repurposing of agencies, rather than
courts, and on government-initiated, rather than privately initiated, regulation. See, e.g.,
Jack
Landman Goldsmith III & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism, in
CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM (John Norton Moore ed., 2004).
57. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Consideringthe Right to Know
in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 164 (2004) (post-September 11 "closure
[of deportation proceedings] represents an instance in which the government wielded
significant power over a deportee's life under conditions of secrecy"); David A. Schulz, How the
Government's Response to 9/11 May Close the Doors to Open Government, 20 COMM. LAw. 3, 3 (2003).
58. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 20.
59. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
60. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrenner House Floor Statement on REAL ID Legislation (Feb. 9, 2005), available at

1375

SENDING THE BUREA UCRA CY TO WAR

seek to implement anti-terrorist measures through the machinery of the
administrative state: the new role imposed on state Department of Motor
Vehicles ("DMVs") in issuing drivers' licenses and the increased discretion
given to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS") to turn
away applicants for political asylum."'
These new roles embody the problems of fit, overdiscretion, and
inexpertise discussed above and thus threaten to produce all the
inefficiencies and irrationalities decried by Weber and the legal process
theorists. In enacting this legislation, Congress has enlisted two agencies that
serve wide swaths of the public to seek out a handful of terrorists. It has
enrolled an agency with a very narrow expertise (the DMV) to conduct far
more sweeping tasks, and it has engaged an agency that has proved itself
inept in applying its ostensible expertise (the USCIS) to act with greater
discretion than ever before. In this sense, the REAL ID Act seems to be an
expression of unfettered optimism that agencies that have never before
exhibited the capability orjudgment to carry out complex, sensitive tasks will
nonetheless now rise to the challenge. But from a more sober perspective,
these measures seem at best misguided, at worst counterproductive, and, in
any event, counter to basic principles of agency law.
A.

STAm DMVs AND DRIvERs'LICENSING

A state DMV may be one of the very few administrative agencies that
virtually every American visits at least once or twice in their lives. According
to a 2002 national survey, ninety-five percent of Americans have a driver's
62
license, and the other five percent have an alternative DMV-issued ID. In
addition to its primary purpose of authorizing driving privileges, the driver's
license has become the most common form of identification, whether for
buying cigarettes or alcohol, cashing a check, or, of course, boarding a
plane. For many Americans, the driver's license is their only governmentissued form of picture ID, making it the most important document in their
possession, the one that enables them to go about every aspect of their daily
lives.

http://judiciary.house.gov/newscenter.aspx?A=433 (noting Rep. Sensenbrenner's sponsorship
of the bill); see also Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); 151 CONG. REc. E225
(2005) (legislative history).
61. REAL ID Act tits. I & II. Other provisions concern border security, REAL ID Act § 102,
tit. II, and visas for H2-B temporary workers, nurses, and Australian nationals, REAL ID Act tits.

IV & V.
62.

AM. ASs'N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM'RS,

NATIONAL SURVEY

http://www.aamva.org (search "02192"; then follow hyperlink).

(2002),

available at
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1. The New Regulatory Scheme
With the REAL ID Act's drivers' license mandates, Congress targeted
agencies whose reform would palpably affect virtually every person in the
United States. Thus, it is the problem of fit that looms largest here, followed
by the problems of inexpertise and overdiscretion. The REAL ID Act directs
states to adopt three major groups of changes in issuing driver's licenses:
(1)New features of the driver's license card itself, including display of
identifying information, such as the person's full legal name and a digital
photo; "common machine readable technology"; and "[p]hysical security
features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication",,63
(2) New standardsfor issuing licenses, requiring DMVs to obtain and verify
proof of identity, residence, and citizenship or legal immigration status; to
confirm that license applicants terminate any valid licenses they hold from
other states; and to issue licenses that expire simultaneously with any
temporary immigration status or, in any event, after no more than eight
64

years;

(3) Verification, storage, and sharing of vastly more personal information than
DMVs have maintained until now, including not only databases with motor
vehicle and driver records but also digital images of all•65
presented identity
documents, such as birth certificates and social security cards.
The Act penalizes states that do not meet these standards by instructing
federal agencies not to accept their licenses for "any official purpose, ,,66 such
as boarding a plane or entering a federal building. Noncompliant states
must issue special licenses that indicate that they are not acceptable
identification for federal purposes, both with a special design or color and

63. The other required features are: birth date, gender, license or card number, principalresidence address, and signature. REAL ID Act § 202(b). DMVs must also "ensure the physical

security" of card-production locations and materials and undertake "appropriate security
clearance requirements" for production employees. Id. § 202(d) (7)-(8).
64.

Id. § 202(c)(1)-(3), (d)(6), (d)(9). The required proof of identity and residence

comprise:
(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is
acceptable if it includes both the person's full legal name and date of birth. (B)
Documentation showing the person's date of birth. (C) Proof of the person's social

security account number or verification that the person is not eligible for a social
security account number. (D) Documentation showing the person's name and
address of principal residence.
Id. § 202(c) (1). DMVs must obtain "valid documentary evidence" of a person's citizenship or
legal immigration status in the United States and train employees in recognizing fraudulent
documents. Id. § 202(c)(2)-(3) & (d)(9).
65. DMVs must keep "digital images of identity source documents ... in electronic storage

in a transferable format" for at least ten years and paper copies for at least seven years. Id §
202(d) (1)-(2). State motor-vehicle databases must contain all driver's-license and driver-record
data and must be accessible electronically to all other states. Id. § 202(d) (12)-(13).
66. These penalties take effect three years after enactment. Id. § 202(a) (1).
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with some sort of printed statement. 67 In light of the many United States
citizens who do not have a passport or other federally accepted
identification, it does not seem like a real option for states to refuse to
acquiesce to these mandates. Nonetheless, Maine and Idaho have passed
laws refusing to comply with the REAL ID Act requirements, and by the end
of March 2007, forty bills had been introduced in twenty-five states
proposing that these states should reject the Act's licensing mandates. 68
There is a reason for this defiance: meeting the standards is not easy.
State officials say the REAL ID Act's requirements are "a nightmare"
(Illinois), may require "extreme measures and possibly a complete
reorganization" (Nebraska), and are "flat-out impossible" to implement in
eotisudbissued by the
h
the time provided (Pnslai)
etme620
(Pennsylvania).9 A September
2006 report

National Governors Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
estimates that it will "cost more than $11 billion to implement the REAL ID
Act" nationwide, dwarfing the Congressional Budget Office's initial estimate
of $100 million. v Even seemingly minor requirements, such as the mandate
that drivers' licenses display a person's full name, will require expensive
software upgrades to enable data fields that can accommodate extremely
long names.7 As of August 2005, only eight percent of states were capable of
verifying identity documents; only six percent could obtain and store digital,
transferable images of those documents; and for eighty-two percent,

67. Id.§202(d)(11).
68. Driving Licenses: Too Much Information, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.
REAL ID State Legislation
economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story-id=8894485;
Database, National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sctran/
RealIDdb.cfm (search for "refusal to comply" under "topic(s)" heading) (last visited May 10,
2007); see also Daniela Gerson, Council to State: Opt out of Law Barring Illegal Immigrants from
Driver's Licenses, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 23, 2005, at 3; James Mayer, Fight over Rules Could Limit Use of
Oregon ID, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.),Jan. 15, 2006, at Al.

69. Brian Bergstein, National Uniform Driver's License Law Is "Nightmare," USA TODAY, Jan.
12, 2006 (quoting an Illinois official, the Nebraska Motor Vehicles Director, and the Deputy
Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, respectively), available at http://
Korey
www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2006-01-12-uniform-drivers-license-x.htm;
Clark, States Voice Real Doubts About REAL ID, STATENET CAP. J., Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.
statenet.com/capitoljournal/01-23-2006.pdf.
70. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, & AM. ASS'N OF
MOTOR VEHICLE ADM'RS, THE REAL ID ACT: NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 3 (2006); see also
Bergstein, supra note 69; Clark, supra note 69; Editorial, REAL !D Legislation Needs a Reality Check,
ROANOKE TIMES (Va.),Jan. 16, 2006, at B6.
71. States also note other pragmatic difficulties: current identity documents do not
necessarily display a person's full name, nor is it clear in all jurisdictions what constitutes a
person's "legal" name. AM. ASS'N OF MOTOR VEHICLES ADMR'S, THE REAL ID ACT: SURVEY OF
THE STATES ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE AND IDENTIFICATION CARD REFORM 4

[hereinafter AAMVA State Survey],
available at
(2005)
cards/aamvasurvey-report.pdf; see also Bergstein, supra note 69.

http://epic.org/privacy/id-
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implementing such programs will require serious financial expenditures,
policy changes, and reprogramming. 72
2.

Fit

These measures are thus a quintessential example of the problem of fit,
for two reasons. First, state DMVs' drivers' licensing rules and procedures
are not targeted at terrorists or terrorist activities. Rather, they are rules of
general applicability that apply to almost every member of the public.
Inevitably, therefore, terrorists represent an extremely small percentage of
those affected by the REAL ID Act's reforms. Moreover, because these
measures do not target terrorists in any particularized way, the chances of
effectively detecting or deterring them among the vast number of people
who participate in this administrative system are equally small. At the same
time, because of the massive scale of DMV operations, the REAL ID Act's
reforms represent a great expense and burden, both to the public and to the
DMVs themselves.
These regulations also present a problem of fit for a second reason: by
attempting to use civil rules that rely on voluntary participation and
compliance to catch non-civil actors, the government creates standards that
are difficult for the law-abiding public to meet and for the agency to
implement, but easy for terrorists and other miscreants to evade. Thus, an
irony emerges: as in the financial regulation setting discussed below,
terrorists and other miscreants may find it easier to circumvent or thwart the
system than law-abiders do to comply with it.
In particular, although drivers' licenses are the most readily available
and important form of identification for the American public, terrorists
could take one of a number of measures-including some that are legal-to
carry on with their activities without participating in the license system. For
one thing, they could obtain other forms of identification that would permit
them to carry out most activities, terrorist or otherwise. A driver's license is
not the exclusive form of identification for any activity, apart from driving
itself.73 As has been frequently noted, the September 11 terrorists could have
purchased tickets and boarded planes with their passports or some other
identification, and it is still perfectly legal to board a plane with non-drivers'
license identification. 4 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how DMVs could

72.
73.

AAMVA State Survey, supra note 71, at 8, 10.
Nor do even those commentators who support the REAL ID Act's provisions favor

adopting an exclusive form of ID. See Paul Rosenzweig & James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Federal
Standardsfor State-Issued Identity Cards: A Reasonable Proposal,BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found.,
Wash. D.C.), Feb. 4, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/upload/74316_l.pdf (noting that foreigners and Americans can board
airplanes with their passports rather than a driver's license).
74. See, e.g., Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L & POL'Y REv. 349, 375 (2005).
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effectively target terrorists amongst all those applying for drivers' licenses,
for drivers' licenses are not necessary for or characteristic of terrorist
activities, nor are they resources that terrorists use or abuse in a distinctive
way that would make them a red flag for terrorist activity.
Foreign terrorists in particular seem to be, if anything, less likely than
American citizens to need a state driver's license, either to carry on with
their everyday lives or to carry out their terrorist activities. Of necessity,
foreign citizens already possess other forms of federally accepted
identification when they enter the United States, such as passports. Foreign
citizens may well have foreign drivers' licenses as well, permitting them to
drive legally within the United States without entering the drivers' licensing
system at all. 75
Alternatively, terrorists could simply obtain and use state-issued drivers'
licenses in their own names, relying on the inherent weaknesses in the
system to limit the effectiveness of screening. The very scale of DMV agency
action that makes a DMV-based system a poor fit for catching terrorists in
the first place also tends to exacerbate some of the potentially disabling
glitches that lurk in virtually all identity-based security systems and that
terrorists may exploit: fraudulent breeder documents, disabling false
positives, and overwhelming amounts of data.
As to the first problem, all identity cards, no matter how high tech, are
no more reliable than what are called "breeder documents": the supporting
documentation that an applicant must produce to obtain the card in the
first place. 76 Here, the only documentation that is common to the entire
American population (and thus the most rigorous form of documentation
that can be demanded by a DMV in its drivers' licensing regime) is the birth
certificate,
which remains as trivially easy to forge now as before the REAL
77
ID

Act.

75. USA.gov, Foreign Visitors Driving in the U.S; Quick Facts for Foreign Visitors About
Driving in the United States, http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Foreign_VisitorsDriving.shtml (last
visitedJan. 25, 2007).
76. See generally Bijon Roy, A Case Against Biometric National Identification Systems (NIDS):
"Trading Off' Privacy Without Getting Security, 19 WINDSOR REv. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 45, 59-61
(2005). A social security card (also required by the REAL ID Act) can be obtained with a birth
certificate, and the final requirement, proof of residence, does not offer any evidence of
identity at all and typically requires nothing more than a form-lease document, which can be
obtained for a few dollars from any office-supply store. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13
§ 202(c)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 312.
77. See Bob Hager & Bob Sullivan, Fake Drivers Licenses Easy to Obtain, MSNBC NEWS, Nov.
21, 2003, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078924; Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in
Screening Entrants into the United States: Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 1-3
(Aug. 2, 2006) (statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations, Government Accountability Office), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06976t.pdf (describing undercover testing in which GAO employees used "commercial
software that is available to the public" to create fake birth certificates and driver's licenses and
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Similarly, the vast size of the pool of individuals in drivers' license
databases exacerbates the well known problem of disabling error rates in
identity databases. The federal government's Terrorist Identities Database
Environment, which is intended to maintain a watch list of terrorism
suspects, had a misidentification rate of almost fifty percent in 2004 and
2005.7 Such problems are not an anomaly: a pilot Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") database intended to store the names of
eligible noncitizen workers suffered from a crippling twenty-eight percent
error rate, and identity databases based on computerized biometric7
recognition tend to yield error rates of between ten and sixty-six percent. 1
Even if the DMVs' databases were to have a ninety-nine percent accuracy
rate, there would be a false positive for one of every 100 people going
through the system-and where the DMVs are concerned, there are millions
of people in the system. At such rates, DMVs would be swamped by the task
of checking false positives.80 Furthermore, this assumes that the resources
exist to review and follow up on all of this data. With millions of drivers in
most states, and several breeder identity documents per driver, the number
of documents that DMVs will need to process, store, and evaluate will quickly
reach into the tens of millions. At this scale, it is likely that the DMVs will
create an overload of information for security screening, just as the National
Security Agency has found itself drowning in the fire hose of data from its
monitoring of electronic communications and as the amount of information
dumped into the Terrorist
Identification Database Environment "threatens
81
to overwhelm" analysts.
Finally, the REAL ID Act's focus on bolstering an identity-based security
system is a poor fit for actual terrorist behavior in another sense. All that
even the best identity-based security system can hope to do on its own is to
accurately connect names to individuals. But because al Qaeda and other
terrorist networks are known to operate through sleeper cells, an
individual's identity, however positively confirmed, is a weak test of that
82
individual's terrorist propensities. For example, as legal visitors to the

successfully use these to enter the United States); Got A Fake ID? Welcome to America, CBS
EVENING NEWS (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/01/eveningnews/

main1857671.shtml.
78. Karen DeYoung, Terror Database Has Quadrupled in Four Years, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
03/24/AR2007032400944.html.
79. Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in NationalIdentification Systems,
15 HARv.J.L. &TECH. 319, 360 (2002).
80. Roy, supra note 76, at 60-64; Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won't Stop Terror,
WIRED.COM, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,70357-.html?tw=wnindex
2.
81. DeYoung, supra note 78; Scott Shane, For the E-Spy, Too Much Information, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2.
82. Roy, supra note 76, at 59; Sobel, supranote 79, at 367.
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United States, the September 11 terrorists would have been eligible for
83

drivers' licenses, albeit temporary ones, under the REAL ID Act.

Indeed, by encouraging reliance on the possession of a driver's license
card as evidence of government-vetted security, this new regime may be
counterproductive. Overconfidence in the driver's license as a signal of
security may reduce the perceived need for other security measures and for
attentiveness to other security indicators. If so, first time, previously
unidentified, and misidentified terrorists, once in possession of a state-issued
driver's license, may find themselves able to act more freely under its
imprimatur of false security.
3.

Inexpertise

In order to serve what is, in effect, the entire public and to process
thousands of people per day, DMVs operate at one extreme of trade-offs in
agency values and characteristics, opting for efficiency over accuracy and for
public accountability over agency discretion. Nondiscretionary standards for
qualification are set by state legislatures and departments of transportation
and applied in rote, assembly line fashion by low-level state-government
bureaucrats on the spot. s4 The rules for obtaining a driver's license or
registering a car are low baseline, coarse grained rules of limited sorting
ability: they do not attempt to optimize safety, driving ability, or any of the
other values they promote, but merely to assure compliance with minimum
standards. In addition, DMVs apply minimal scrutiny to public compliance
with these rules, typically accepting proffered documents and information at
face value, relying on the notion that most of those who participate do so
voluntarily and in good faith.
In brief, DMVs have developed a narrow, specialized expertise-the
registration, insurance, and safety of automobiles-and a distinctive
approach to managing their massive mandate-maintaining a high volume,
low budget operation. The results are striking: although citizens widely
deride DMVs as inefficient and slow, s5 driver licensing is nonetheless, as

83.

Review and Outlook, National ID Party,WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2005, available at http://

www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=l 10006316.
84. E.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501-20 (West 2005).
85. As recalled on a humor website:
After spending 3-1/2 hours enduring the long lines, surly clerks and insane
regulations at the Department of Motor Vehicles, I stopped at a toy store to pick
up a gift for my son. I brought my selection-a Louisville slugger baseball bat-to
the cash register. "Cash or charge?" the clerk asked. "Cash," I snapped. Then
apologizing for my rudeness, I explained, "I've spent the afternoon at the motorvehicle bureau." "Shall I gift wrap the bat?" the clerk asked sweetly, "or are you
going back to the DMV?"
Amazing Humor.com, Funny Political Jokes, Nothing Like the DMV, http://www.
amazinghumor.com/jokes/politicaljokes/nothinglikethedmv.shtml (last visitedJan 25. 2007).
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compared to other types of agency functions, a relatively simple and swift
adjudication process that requires no special training, with rules and
implementation that are accessible and understandable to the general
public.
In this light, measures like the REAL ID Act's requirement that DMVs
verify applicants' immigration status take DMVs outside their area of
expertise and undermine their core purpose. While the primary purpose of
drivers' licenses is to ensure that all drivers have basic driving skills, an
understanding of the rules of the road, and possession of appropriate
insurance, the REAL ID Act will force millions of illegal immigrants out of
the licensing and insurance system. 86 This step may also undermine one of
the Act's national security goals. If one purpose of the REAL ID Act's
identity databases is to create comprehensive records of those in the
country, the absence of these millions of immigrants from those records will
thwart that aim as well.
The REAL ID Act's mandates may also prove counterproductive to
other national security goals, for in this setting, a job done poorly may be
worse than a job not done at all. The risks of fraud and identity theft loom
particularly large. The REAL ID Act's mandated electronic databases of
scanned breeder documents will offer fresh opportunities for fraud, even as
they close off others, by creating "one stop shopping" in identity information
and documentation for hackers, thieves, and terrorists.8s These new
databases could present a new target for terrorism; just as new, seemingly
secure documents could serve as a Trojan horse for terrorist activity due to
their higher presumption of reliability. Inexpert DMV administration of
88
identity documents and databases is not just self-defeating, but dangerous.

86. In advocating for such measures, proponents of stricter penalties for illegal
immigrants undervalue the benefits of licensing a driver that accrue to the public by
safeguarding them from unsafe or uninsured drivers. Compare Rosenzweig & Carafano, supra
note 73, at 5-6, with Legal Presence and DL/ID-Should Undocumented Immigrants Be
Allowed to Have a DL/ID?, http://www.aamva.org/aamva/DocumentDisplay.aspx?id=%
7B028B748F-AC91-4A7C-AD6F-4777F6AFE469%7D (last visited May 14, 2007) (documenting
the debate of the pros and cons of allowing undocumented immigrants to have a drivers'
license or identification card).
87. Roy, supra note 76, at 71; A. Michael Froomkin, Creatinga Viral FederalPrivacy Standard,
48 B.C. L. REv. 55 (2007); Patrick Peterson, Real ID Act Spurs Real Concerns, FLA. TODAY (Brevard
County, Fla.), May 13, 2005, availableat http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/may2005/
130505realconcerns.htm; see alsojamesJay Carafano, Paul Rosenzeig, & Alane Kochems, Encrypt
E-Passports, HERITAGE FOUND., Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.Heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/wm687.cfm (giving a conservative critique of inadequately safeguarded
document technology).
88. For a conservative analysis of measures necessary to protect data, see Paul Rosenzweig
& Alane Kochems, Data Protection: Safeguarding Privacy in a New Age of Technology, HERITAGE
FOUND., Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/lm16.cfm.

SENDING THE BUREA UCRA CY TO WAR

4.

1383

Overdiscretion

Fundamental principles of administrative law would suggest that an
assignment of new authority (and especially authority outside an agency's
expertise) should be accompanied by increased external oversight of that
authority. But here, although the REAL ID Act grants new spheres of
authority to DMV employees, it offers no direction to these agencies as to
the procedures they should follow, nor does it make any provisions for
oversight or review. The REAL ID Act thus expands DMV discretion while at
the same time requiring the agency to undertake tasks at which it is
inexpert, ultimately placing access to an essential public benefit at the mercy
of street-level DMV employees.
We might hope that the DMVs will not follow the patterns of other
agencies like the Treasury Department 9 that have delegated their new
responsibilities to low-level bureaucrats with singular decision-making
authority. However, given the volume of drivers' license applications to be
processed and the lack of any mandate of oversight or review in the Act, it is
difficult to imagine that DMVs will do otherwise.
Past experience also suggests that unfettered DMV exercise of
discretion in this area may produce less than salutary results. When trying to
clear up the incorrect and duplicate social security numbers in its system a
few years ago, the New York DMV decided that the optimal way to do so was
to threaten to summarily suspend 600,000 licenses if the holders did not
provide valid social security numbers within fifteen days. Particularly in light
of the database error rates discussed above, the DMV's failure to adopt a
more moderate approach seems imprudent, at best. A lawsuit prevented this
step from being implemented, primarily because the judge found that the
DMV acted outside its discretion. 90 Now, under the REAL ID Act, the New
York DMV has this authority, but it is unlikely it has developed the capacity
to exercise prudently its newly delegated discretion. 9'
5.

The Effect on Proxies

What is most striking about the REAL ID Act's new DMV mandates is
that none of them has anything directly to do either with terrorist activities
or with singling out and targeting behaviors that are red flags for
terrorism-nor are they intended to. As such, these measures target proxy
groups: those who are unable to provide and unwilling to falsify the

supporting documentation necessary to obtain drivers' licenses. Advocates of
the REAL ID Act's measures argue that this will have some indirect effect on

89. See discussion infra Part IV.
90. See Cubas v. Martinez, No. 112371/04, slip op. at 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 9, 2005),
availableat http://www.nycourts.gov/press/dmvFinal.pdf (enjoining the DMV).
91. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c) (1), 119 Stat. 231, 312 (2005).
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terrorists that is itself enough to justify these sweeping reforms.92 But the
groups that the REAL ID Act's provisions are in fact most likely to capture
are exactly the proxy groups they target-in this case, primarily illegal
immigrants. While we may wish to limit illegal immigration, such measures
should be justified on their own merits according to the costs and benefits
involved in targeting illegal immigration, not by putting the false weight of a
national security finger on the scales.93
These regulations will also affect other vulnerable populations who are
unable to meet one or more of the new requirements: "poor, elderly or
disabled residents [unable] to produce the necessary documents,"9 4 legal
immigrants whose documents are difficult to verify, and devout members of
faiths whose tenets forbid them to display their faces for photo
identification.9 5 Other members of the general public will likely be caught
up as well, whether through the DMV's inexpert, unsupervised
administration or simply through the ordinary error rates in identity
databases. The effect on these proxy groups and others is potentially dire: in
addition to the loss of federally acceptable ID, denial of the driving privilege
may amount, in some areas, to loss of the opportunity to work, attend
school, and otherwise lead a responsible, self-sustaining existence. 96
6.

Conclusion

All in all, the DMV drivers' licensing system is an astonishingly poor fit
for detecting and deterring terrorist activities. As a regime that affects the
entire public, its reform imposes enormous financial costs on agencies
intended to serve an entirely different purpose. As a system applicable to the
public at large, it does not successfully target hallmarks of terrorist activity,
and by virtue of its sheer scope and size, it cannot function effectively in
identifying and isolating individuals who present security threats. The REAL
ID Act's security imperatives push an agency from its classic bureaucratic
task of rationalizing a narrow set of expert tasks to purposes and procedures
in which it has no special expertise and which require discretionary decisionmaking from low-level bureaucrats accustomed to rote application of simple
rules with no particular provision for oversight. It is a fundamental mismatch
92. Rosenzweig & Carafano, supra note 73, at 3
93. Some conservative commentators agree that the immigration issue "really is separate
from the national interest in more reliable and secure forms of identification" and "[if]
regulating immigration and incentives affecting illegal immigration is the real purpose of
congressional legislation, it ought to be addressed in separate legislation." Id. at 6.
94. REAL 1D Legislation Needs a Reality Check, supra note 70, at B6.
95.

COUNCIL

ACCOMMODATION

ON

AMERICAN-ISLAMIC

RELATIONS

RESEARCH

CTR.,

RELIGIOUS

IN DRIVER'S LICENSE PHOTOGRAPHS: A REVIEW OF CODES, POLICIES AND

IN THE 50 STATES 3 (2004), available at http://www.cair-net.org/downloads/
driversphoto.pdf.
96. See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Book Review, "Aliens" in Our Midst Post9/11: LegislatingOutsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1717-18 (2005).
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between agency discretion and external oversight and between task and
expertise.
B.

USCIS AND POLITICAL ASYLUM

Political asylum is meant to provide a safe haven for refugees and a
bulwark against genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and other
violations of human rights. In order to obtain asylum in the United States,
an applicant must have experienced "persecution or [have] a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion" in her home country (or, if
the applicant is stateless, in her country of long-term residence). 97
While the admission of asylees as such into the United States dates back
only to the 1950s, the process continues a much longer tradition of
accepting immigrants who are fleeing persecution or simply seeking a better
life. In so doing, it contributes to a central aspect of our national identity:
that we are, as President George W. Bush put it, "a stronger and better
nation because of the hard work and the faith and the entrepreneurial spirit
of immigrants" and that we have benefited by welcoming those whose
"talents and dreams" other societies have rejected or repressed.98
In addition to these roles, political asylum has traditionally served
national security goals. Indeed, until 1980, asylum admissions were openly
tied to foreign policy, as eligibility to apply for asylum was determined by ad
hoc legislation authorizing
admissions from communist states and other
• 99
Cold War enemies.
Today, admission of asylees still presents an
opportunity to cultivate an image of the United States as a "beacon for
freedom" 00 and to vilify the nations from which refugees have fled.10'

97. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 101 (a) (42) (A) (2005).
98. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Proposes New Temporary
Worker Program: Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/O1/20040107-3.html. President Bush stated:
By tradition and conviction, our country is a welcoming society. America is a stronger
and better nation because of the hard work and the faith and the entrepreneurial
spirit of immigrants. Every generation of immigrants has reaffirmed the wisdom of
remaining open to the talents and dreams of the world.
Id.
99. Michael McBride, Migrants and Asylum-Seekers, 37 INT'L MIGRATION 289, 292-94 (1999);
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL32621, U.S. IMMIGRATION

POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 2 (2005), availableat http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/
rl32621.pdf.
100. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation
(Sep. 11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.
html.
101. In 2003, the top three countries for approved asylum claims were Colombia, China,
and Haiti, in contrast to the U.S.SR., Vietnam, and Cuba during the Cold War. OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION

STATISTICS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 47 (2004).

HOMELAND SECURITY,

2003 YEARBOOK

OF

92 IOWA LA WREVIEW

1386

1.

[2007]

The New Regulatory Scheme

While the U.S. government has treated asylum as a means to secure its
foreign policy goals through strategic admissions, it has also feared that
these admissions present a security risk, since applicants typically hail from
states that are oppressive, unstable, or both.1 2 The REAL ID Act is a
legislative expression of this fear, and it is not the first. In 1996, following a
series of terrorist attacks-some committed by foreign nationals, including
asylum seekers, and others committed by U.S. citizens-Congress enacted
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). 1 "'
Among other measures, AEDPA eliminated judicial review of certain
deportation orders and expedited asylum proceedings, 0 4 while IIRIRA
expanded on AEDPA's provisions and provided for mandatory detention of
many asylum seekers, "expedited removal" of asylum seekers at the border,
and imposed other limits on asylum applications.' 0 5 The REAL ID Act also
builds upon the post-September 11 PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 ("IRTPA"), which introduced
broader definitions of terrorism10 6and terrorist associations for purposes of
deportation and inadmissibility.

102. For example, in 2005, the four countries that produced far and away the greatest
absolute numbers of successful asylum applicants to the United States, comprising more than
one-third of all the granted applications that year, were China, Colombia, Albania, and Haiti.
OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND TECH., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS: FY
2005 ASYLUM STATISTICS 1-2, 4 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/
FY05AsyStats.pdf; see also BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY

233-35 (2004).
103. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009-546. Curiously, while the anti-immigration aspects of these
measures were based, at least in part, on attacks committed by noncitizens, they seem to have
been most immediately spurred by the Oklahoma City bombing, which had no known foreign
involvement. Also in play were economic and social concerns raised by asylum procedures that
were considered too lax since ultimately unsuccessful applicants were able to readily enter and
remain in the United States under the procedures then in place. Kathryn Harrigan Christian,
Comment, NationalSecurity and the Victims of Immigration Law, 35 STETSON L. REV. 1001, 1014-16
(2006); DAVID A. MARTIN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE 1995 ASYLUM REFORMS: A
HISTORIC AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2000), http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/back500.pdf.
104. AEDPA §§ 440, 421-23.
105. Id.; IIRIRA § 604; 8 U.S.C. §1252 (a)(2) (C) (2001)
106.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272. In the debate over the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Congress considered, but did not enact, many of the
measures that eventually were included the REAL ID Act. ANDORRA BRUNO ET AL.,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL33125, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ISSUES IN
THE 109TH CONGRESS 2 (2005), availableat http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P14.pdf.
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In Title I of the REAL ID Act, "Amendments to Federal Laws to Protect
against Terrorist Entry," Congress amended numerous sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), introducing certain crucial
changes affecting how the USCIS processes asylum claims:
(1) The Act makes the legal standard for attaining refugee status more
demandingfor all asylum applicants, requiring asylum applicants to establish
that "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant";0 7
(2) It vests greaterdiscretion in the administrativeadjudicatorin assessing the
applicant's credibility and requiring corroborating evidence even of
"persuasive" testimony;'0 8 and
(3) It limits judicial review of the adjudicator'sexpanded exercise of discretion
by preserving judicial review only for constitutional and legal claims (as
required by a 2001 Supreme Court decision) and not for discretionary or
factual findings.' 0 9
Attempts to correlate asylum applicants and terrorists have proven to be
weak, however, leading us to focus again on the problem of fit in this
context. Within USCIS, the problems of overdiscretion and inexpertise
interact synergistically, so we discuss those problems together.
2.

Fit

Like the REAL ID Act's drivers' licensing provisions, its asylum
provisions do not attempt to hone the asylum adjudication system's ability to
distinguish terrorist from non-terrorist applicants."0 Instead, they change

107. REAL ID Act § 101 (a) (3), Pub L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (emphasis
added); cf Matter of T-M-B, 21 1. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (BIA 1997) (stating that applicants must
"produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least
in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground"); Matter of Fuentes, 19 1. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA
1998) (stating that an applicant "must demonstrate that he is unwilling or unable to return to
his country" because of "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion" (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982))).
108. REAL IDAct§ 101(a)(3).
109.
The Act also specifically bars courts from reversing requirements of corroborative
evidence unless "a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable." Id. § 101 (e). In addition, it vests discretion over asylum decisions in the
Director of Homeland Security, in addition to the Attorney General; eliminates a planned study
on vulnerabilities in the asylum system; and, in a pair of changes benefiting asylum applicants,
lifts the caps on applicants whose claims are based on coercive population controls and on the
number of asylees permitted to change status to permanent residents each year. Id. § 101 (b)(d), (f)-(h).
110.
It is worth noting that in its non-asylum-related immigration provisions, the Act also
expands the prohibited connections to terrorism that bar all immigrants from admissibility. Id.
§ 103(b)-(c) (2005). Of particular note are its new definitions of "material support" for a
"terrorist organization," which diverge from the criminal definitions of crucial terms and are of
troubling breadth. Compare id. with 18 USC §§ 2339a-2339b (as amended by the USA PATRIOT
Act); see also Hearing on Amendments to the Material Support for Terrorism Laws: Section 805 of the
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the baseline rules for a large population that is voluntarily providing
information to the government in exchange for the benefit of political
asylum. Like drivers' licensing, political asylum is neither necessary to
terrorist activity, nor is it something that terrorists use in distinctive ways that
are a red flag for terrorism. As with drivers' licensing, the only way of
searching for terrorists in the pool of asylum applicants is to examine each
application, one by one. It is a large pool: while the political asylum process
does not implicate virtually every person in the United States as drivers'
licensing does, in 2003, the agency received applications for 61,660
applicants and family members, and during the period from 1996 to 2002,
there was an average of 64,697 applications per year."'
Moreover, the fit between this pool and terrorists is a weak one. As the
9/11 Commission staff has noted, "very few people" amongst the millions of
annual immigrants to the United States pose any threat to national
security. ' 2 Asylum applicants are no exception to this rule. Virtually every
incident of convicted terrorists entering via the asylum system dates to the
early 1990s, before mandatory FBI security checks and detention of virtually
all entering asylum seekers made asylum an unappealing avenue into the
United States.'1 3 Asylum is a voluntary system, only one of many ways of
entering the United States, and terrorists can and do opt out of this system
by choosing one of these other paths. At present, the available evidence
concerning asylum seekers' propensity to engage in terrorist activity seems
to be anecdotal, not systematic: we did not find any data on the number of
immigrants who engage in or support terrorist activity, much less on the

PATRIOT Act and Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism PreventionAct of 2004 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (May 10, 2005) (statement of Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties
Union of S. Cal.), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17536leg20050510.html;
USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005, 151 Cong. Rec. H622103, H6233 (July 21, 2005).
111.
The number of applications has fluctuated substantially, with peak levels in the
hundreds of thousands of applications per year in the mid-1990s. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 56, 68 (2004), available at http://

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003/Yearbook.pdf.
112. NAT'L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
383 (2004), [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.9-Ilcommission.
gov/report/911Report.pdf. Some of these immigrants come for brief visits, while others stay
for longer periods.
113. Lofgren, supra note 74, at 355-56, 366-67 & 375; WASEM, supranote 99, at 10. There
is, however, a substantial and well-publicized problem of asylum applicants who have themselves
been the victims of terrorism being rejected on the basis of the material-support provisions
discussed supra note 110. Darryl Fears, Conservatives Decry Terror Laws' Impact on Refugees, WASH.
POST, Jan. 8, 2007, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/01/07/AR2007010701144.html. Thus far, the government's only response has
been a limited waiver program for applicants from a handful of countries. Rachel L. Swarms,
Administration Offers Plan to Ease Rules on Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18, available at
2007 WLNR 651443.
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number of asylum seekers who do so, nor any data comparing terrorist
propensities among immigrants as opposed to citizens.' 14
Furthermore, if the correlation between asylum seekers and terrorists is
poor, the correlation between the changes introduced by the REAL ID Act
and terrorist behavior is worse. As in other agencies that depend on
information volunteered by participants in exchange for a benefit, reforms
to the general reporting standards applicable to all participants burden
genuine, good faith participants as a matter of course. However, they tend to
be easy for terrorists and other bad faith actors to evade by providing false
information. Genuine asylum applicants often do not have corroborating
evidence for their claim, having fled their countries without stopping to
gather supporting documentation.' 1 5 Nor can asylum applicants always
demonstrate the motive
of their persecutors and how "central" that motive is
S 116
to their persecution.
As Representative Langevin argued, with some
rhetorical hyperbole, in protest of the REAL ID Act's restrictions, "Can we
imagine sending a refugee back to face genocide in the Sudan because he or
she does not have a letter from the government explaining that religion was
the reason his or her family was murdered?"" 7 But by obtaining false
documentation and providing false testimony, terrorists can readily appear
to meet these standards. These measures thus present the quintessential
problem of using civil rules to try to reach non-civil actors: those actors
either opt out or simply refuse to play by the rules.
3.

Inexpertise and Overdiscretion"

8

The REAL ID Act's asylum measures take an agency that is excoriated
for its incompetence and abuse of discretion and grant it greater authority
and discretion in the name of national security. In theory, the USCIS ought
to have the expertise to accurately adjudicate asylum claims and exercise
discretion judiciously. However, when we look below the surface of the
agency's assigned capability and authority to assess how the agency actually
exercises that capability and authority, the reality is quite different.
In fact, judicial review has long revealed the U.S. immigration agency to
be a disorganized and beleaguered organization,
notorious for backlogs and
S •• 119
for arbitrary, legally erroneous decisions.
While efforts to improve

114.

E.g., Philip Martin & Susan Martin, Managing Migration to Prevent Terrorism, in 29

(2001); CARL F. HOROWITZ, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, AN
EXAMINATION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND SERIOUS CRIME 9-10 (2001).
MIGRATION WORLD 19

115.

See MARTIN, supra note 103, at 3
116. Id.
117.
151 CONG. REC. E247 (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Rep.James R. Langevin).
118. While we discuss these two issues separately in other sections of this Article, here we
address them together because the problems are so closely interrelated in this context.
119. Congress has repeatedly passed laws divesting the courts of appellate and habeas
jurisdiction over immigration decisions. The REAL ID Act codifies a recent Supreme Court
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performance at the asylum officer level have reportedly borne some fruit,
this has not been so at the level of immigration judges-the determinative
fact finders in any claims that are not immediately granted upon initial
review. Federal judges reviewing asylum decisions have repeatedly found, in
the words of Judge Posner, that "the adjudication of these cases at the
administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice." 120 In December 2005 and January 2006, judges reviewing asylum
decisions in the Third and Seventh Circuits castigated the involved
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (the body that
carries out administrative reviews) for a pattern of arbitrary, unlawful, and
biased rulings: "At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate
our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals

....

The

performance of these federal agencies is too often inadequate."'
The REAL ID Act's measures rely on raising the legal standards for
asylum and increasing agency discretion in holding applicants to those
standards. However, USCIS's inadequacy in adjudicating claims suggests that
such an approach is likely to be counterproductive. As Patricia Freshwater
has noted, "terrorists are already barred from any grant of asylum if their
claims are accurately adjudicated. For this reason, the United States should
have a security interest in providing the most accurate adjudication of
asylum claims possible."' 22 The REAL ID Act's focus on standards,
corroborating evidence, and applicant credibility are red herrings: the weak
link is not the standards that the agency is asked to apply, but agency
incompetence and abuse of discretion in applying them.
Altering legal standards in asylum cases is a particularly curious way of
addressing any security holes that might be perceived to exist in the asylum
system in light of the fact that the FBI conducts expert, direct security checks
of all asylum seekers. The FBI security check is the first step in the evaluation
of an asylum claim, and it includes fingerprinting as well as multiple
background checks in the terrorist, immigration, and law enforcement

decision, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), asserting that review of constitutional and legal
claims must be available, while the Act expressly strips the courts of jurisdiction over any
discretionary or fact-based claims. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat.

302, 310-11 (2003). For an analysis of the judicial-review provisions of the REAL ID Act, see
generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 459 (2006).
120. Adam Liptak, Courts CriticizeJudges'Handlingof Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005,
at A1 (quotingJudge Richard A. Posner).
121. Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 passim (3d Cir. 2006).
122. Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the Convention Against
Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture of Its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR.
LJ. 585, 592 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).
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databases, notably the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS)," 1"
which links to seven other FBI, former INS, and State Department
"
databases, 1 4 and an "expanded screening list ,12

against which foreign

nationals can be checked. While no one would claim that the FBI performs
its tasks perfectly, surely improving FBI performance would be a more
effective security measure than supplementing expert FBI terrorist
investigations with inexpert UCICS evaluations that are not specifically
targeted at detecting terrorist activity.126
Remarkably, the REAL ID Act actually undermines the development of
agency expertise rather than bolstering it. Among its other measures, the
Act scuttled a study called for by the IRTPA in 2004 that was to have
investigated how many, if any, asylum applicants have been connected in
some way to terrorist activities, as well as the effects of the relevant legal
standards on those cases. This is data that the agency might have used to
develop real expertise in sussing out terrorists or to conclude that the
asylum system is not the place to be looking for them after all. 127 Instead, the
REAL ID Act simply presumed that these linkages exist and cancelled the
2

study.

8

Core concepts of administrative law suggest that when agencies
consistently carry out their tasks incompetently, and especially when internal
agency oversight mechanisms prove ineffective, the balance between agency
29
discretion and external oversight should shift toward greater oversight.1
Here, it seems obvious that, as a matter of agency capability, these
administrative adjudicators need more supervision, not less. Instead, the
REAL ID Act increases agency discretion and limits judicial oversight of the
130
very fact-based determinations that are at the heart of asylum claims.

supra note 99, at 10.

123.

WASEM,

124.

Id. at 10 n.35.

125. President George W. Bush, Speech Outlining a Plan to Give Legal Status to
Immigrants (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?
ARTICLEID=36498.
126. Identified terrorists and members of terrorist organizations are already barred by
statute from receiving asylum, irrespective of the validity of their claims of persecution, as are
applicants who are deemed terrorist risks, have advocated terrorist activity, or have given
material support to a terrorist organization. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (B) (2000).
127. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §
5403(a)-(b), 118 Star. 3638, 3737 (2004).
128. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(i) 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005); see also
151 CONG. REC. 455 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (stating that
terrorists were barred by statute from claiming asylum and that, in any event, it was unlikely that
a terrorist would attempt to use it).
129. Discussion supra Part II.A.
130. This is particularly calamitous because it follows upon a 2002 change in agency policy
that curtailed the administrative process of review for asylum decisions, adopting new rules that,
among other things, permit a single BIA member to issue a summary dismissal of an
administrative appeal without any written opinion. John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many

1392

92 IOWA LAWREVIEW
4.

[2007]

The Impact on Proxies

The REAL ID Act's provisions on political asylum target a particularly
vulnerable group as proxies for terrorists: those who have been driven from
their homes by persecution and are at the mercy of another state to take
them in. As Immigration Judge Denise Slavin, the President of the National
Association of Immigration Judges, has explained, asylum adjudications
involve high stakes, "life-or-death decisions in terms of whether you're going
to send someone back to a place where they may be killed."13' While the
harm that could come from inadvertently granting a terrorist's claims for
asylum is certainly great, the risk of harm faced by asylum seekers
erroneously deported to their home countries is also serious.
In passing the REAL ID Act, Congress also targeted another kind of
proxy: the political asylum process itself. These reforms take one side in a
longstanding, ongoing debate over the proper legal and evidentiary
standards in the political asylum process. Some critics of the pre-REAL ID
Act tests and evidentiary standards asserted that they were too low to
effectively cull out fraudulent and terrorist applicants, 13 2 while others
contended that the same tests and standards were so demanding as to
obstruct recognition of legitimate claims. 133 Underlying the claims of both
camps is the argument that the adjudicative process has a limited capacity to
assess cases that are centered on the types of legal questions the process asks
and subject to the limited evidence available to many asylum applicants. I
But if these critiques are correct, they should raise similar questions
about the potential capacity of this system to distinguish between terrorist
and non-terrorist applicants and about the effectiveness of the REAL ID Act
reforms, no matter what standards are applied. Heightened evidentiary
standards will not help adjudicators make more accurate decisions if the
evidence necessary to meet those standards is as often lacking in cases of

People ChallengingBoard of Immigration Appeals in Federal Court?An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Recent
Surge in Petitionsfor Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 28 (2005). Previously, panels of three board
members would hear appeals and issue written decisions in each case. Id. The changes are an

effort to remedy a backlog of over 56,000 cases. Id. at 3. Federal judges reviewing these cases on
appeal have offered vitriolic criticism of this change, stating that the current process constitutes

no review at all. Id. at 29-31.
131.

Liptak, supra note 120, atAl.

132. Mark Krikorian, Who Deserves Asylum?, COMMENT.,June 1996, at 52, available at http://
www.cis.org/articles/ 1996/msk6-96.html.
133. Considering case studies of asylum seekers fleeing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan
civil wars, Susan Bibler Coutin concluded that "continual violence, surveillance and
interrogation made the causes of persecution unclear and defined average people as potentially

subversive," creating a "gap between legal definitions of persecution and the repressive tactics
that are directed at suspect populations." Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect and the
Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 63, 65, 75
(2001).
134. MARTIN, supra note 103, at 3.
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persecution as in cases of non-persecution. In asylum cases, whether
fraudulent or genuine, the amount of information available is often limited
by geographical and chronological distance, unavailability of witnesses, lack
of access to or loss of key documents, the effect of trauma on the memory
and testimony of the applicant, cultural and linguistic barriers, and so forth.
The lack of any apparent connection between the REAL ID Act's new
standards and terrorism as such, together with the connection to this
longstanding debate in asylum law, suggests that in passing the REAL ID Act,
Congress and the Bush Administration may not have been aiming for
terrorists and hitting a proxy group at all. Rather, the government may have
hit exactly the target it had in its sights by achieving desired13 5reforms to the
political asylum process under the guise of national security.
Beyond the effect on asylum applicants and on the political asylum
process, the REAL ID Act's focus on foreigners as a proxy for terrorists is
dangerous for national security as well. Of course, domestic terrorism is far
from unknown in the United States, as the Unabomber, Timothy McVeigh,
and other well known American terrorists illustrate. The assumption that
post-September 11 terrorists are necessarily foreigners has already been put
to the lie in Britain, where the suspects in the July 2005 bombing attacks on
London public transportation were "British, born and bred." 13 6 In the
United States, while the September 11 attacks were particularly spectacular
and deadly, "the number of domestic terrorist acts in the past five years far
outweighs the number of international acts."137 Pointing to domestic
terrorists like William Krar, "an East Texas man who stockpiled enough
sodium cyanide to gas everyone in a building the size of a high school
basketball gymnasium before he was arrested in 2002, '3s one terrorism
expert warned that "[t]he government has a severe case of tunnel vision
when it comes to domestic terrorism."1 3 9 While we should not turn a blind

135. See Cohen et al., supra note 20, at 724-27 (making a similar argument concerning the
government's decision to transfer agencies into the Department of Homeland Security).
136. Matthew Chance, Britain's Home-grown Terrorists, CNN.COM, July 14, 2005, http://www.
cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/14/homegrown.terror/.
137. Kris Axtman, The Terror Threat at Home, Often Overlooked, THE CHRISTIAN SC1. MONITOR,
Dec. 29, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1229/p02s01-usju.html (referring
to an interview with Mark Pitcavage of the factfinding department at the Anti-Defamation

League).
138. Larry Copeland, Domestic Terrorism: New Trouble at Home, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-14-domestic-terrorism-x.htm;
see also Terry
Frieden, FBI, ATF Address Domestic Terrorism, CNN.COM, May 19, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/US/05/19/domestic.terrorism; Democracy Now: FBI Whistleblower: White Supremacists are
Major Domestic Terror Threat (radio broadcast May 19, 2005), available at http://www.
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/06/13/145217 (interviewing former FBI agent Mike

German).
139.

Axtman, supra note 137 (quoting Daniel Levitas, author of THE TERRORIST NEXT

DOOR: THE MILITIA MOVEMENT AND THE RADICAL RIGHT (2002)).

1394

92 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2007]

eye to the risks of foreign terrorism, focusing our national security measures
almost exclusively on foreign risks is to mistake the proxy for the terrorist.
5.

Conclusion

Targeting immigrants as proxies for terrorists may make us all feel safer,
but these measures are unlikely to make us safer in fact, especially in the
inexpert, unsupervised hands of the USCIS. Rather than focusing on
improving the security measures that are already in place, taking measures
to improve the expertise and capability of asylum adjudicators, or at least
increasing oversight of their alarmingly arbitrary practices, the REAL ID
Act's reforms seem guaranteed to introduce more risk into the system.
IV. THE PATRIOT ACT AND THE FINANCIAL WAR AGAINST TERROR

A.

OFA C AND THE EvoLUTIoN OF THE ASSET FREEZE

Many commentators have worried about the civil-liberties problems
created by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC"). t 40 Because the agency is freezing the assets of organizations it
suspects of cooperation with terrorists through a civil administrative process
that involves none of the usual checks of the Fourth Amendment, their fears
are not unwarranted.14 ' But we think there are even more fundamental
problems with OFAC's war on terror. The use of financial regulation to take
and, in some cases, operate the property of American charities and
individuals in the name of that war has been inexpert and unchannelled, as
14
well as incongruous. 1

140. See, e.g., Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justicefor the "Designated":The Process That Is Due to
Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1388, 1405-19 (2005) ("The current
procedures provided to U.S. entities under IEEPA fall far short of meeting basic due process
requirements."); Laila Al-Marayati, American Muslim Charities:Easy Targets in the War on Terror,25
PACE L. REV. 321, 321 (2005) (discussing how government actions in the war on terror
"seriously affect the rights of Americans both to engage in charitable giving and to know that
their government's efforts directly result in the increased safety and security of the American
people").
141. As the 9/11 Commission staff has observed, "[T] he use of administrative orders with
few due process protections, particularly against our own citizens, raises significant civil liberty
concerns and risks a substantial backlash." NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 50 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION

TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH], available at http://www.9-Ilcommission.gov/staff_
statements/91 1_TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
142. The OFAC did do some terrorism regulation before September 11. AEDPA, which
Congress passed in the mid-90s, authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, to designate an organization as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization ("FTO"). 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2000). Designation as an FTO has
significant consequences to an organization, its members, and its supporters, not least because
of what the OFAC is then authorized to do-namely, freeze all assets of a FfO in or controlled
by a U.S. financial institution. See id. Additionally, representatives and certain members of FTOs
may be barred from entry into the United States, see id. § 1182(a) (3) (B), and may play a role if
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In the following Subpart, we describe the regulatory regime that OFAC
administers. That regime is designed to prevent terrorists from using
property-originally, assets kept in regulated financial institutions, but now,
any form of property-within the reach of Department of Treasury
regulators. 43 It is a scheme that has turned regulators who tracked the assets
of foreign countries with whom we were at war into regulators who grab the
assets of individuals-often individual American citizens-who might wish us
ill. In this Subpart, we consider some of the administrative problems that the
new regulatory scheme has created.
1.

The New Regulatory Scheme

Twelve days after September 11, the President issued an executive order
declaring a national emergency and authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to freeze the assets of groups or individuals that, among other
things, "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological
support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of
terrorism." 1 44 The

President

acted,

he

announced,

"because

of the

pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign
terrorists.' 45 The authority for these freezes46came from the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").1
Many of the powers granted to OFAC under IEEPA predated
September 11, although September 11 prompted the agency to reinterpret
these powers. The pre-September 11 IEEPA granted the President authority
"to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President

the FTO's supporters find themselves facing criminal prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)

(2000).
143.

In addition to serving as a financial regulator, the OFAC also issues export licenses

and regulates some other aspects of the interaction between Americans and foreign nations
with whom we are at, or close to being at, war. For background, see Rudolph Lehrer, Comment,
Unbalancing the Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis of U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on International
Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 336-40 (2005); R. Richard Newcomb, Coping with
U.S. Export Controls, 844 PLI/Comm. 105, 109 (2002) (setting forth the former director's
description of the agency).
144. Exec. Order No. 13,224 § l(d)(i), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). For more
background, see John B. Reynolds III et al., Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 37 INT'L LAW.
263, 265 (2003).
145. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079. As one federal banking official
explained to Congress, the OFAC is acting "under presidential wartime and national emergency
powers and authority granted by specific legislation to impose controls on transactions and
freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction." The Bank Secrecy Act and the USA PATRIOT Act
Before H. Comm. on Int'l Rel., 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Herbert A. Biern, Senior
Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm.
146. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (Supp. 2003).
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declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."' 47 IEEPA gave
the President the ability to "freeze" the assets of nations with whom the
148
United States is either at war or had designated to be a national enemy.
The statute also provided for the sanctioning of supporters and nationals of
the enemy.149
The PATRIOT Act added to these powers the ability to "block" assets
during the pendency of civil investigations into whether particular
individuals, entities, or organizations were engaged in these activities., 50 The
President claimed that the blocking power was necessary "because of the
ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously," meaning that "prior
notice to [investigation targets] would render [OFAC's freeze powers]
ineffectual." 15' The PATRIOT Act also permitted designations to be justified
and defended in court with classified, ex-parte evidence in order to protect
15
intelligence sources and methods from discovery by the targeted party. 1
After September 11, the President announced the creation of a class of
Specially Designated Global Terrorists ("SDGTs)-a bureaucratic move that
he declared was "a major thrust of our war on terrorism" and a "strike on the
financial foundation of the global terror network.",153 Executive Order No.

147. Id.§ 1701(a).
148. Id. § 1701 (a)(1)(c).
149. Id.; see generally Hon. Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The
Interactions Between the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the
Nation's Security, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459 (2005); Angela D. Hardister, Can We Buy
Peace on Earth?: The Priceof Freezing TerroristAssets in a Post-September 11 World, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 605 (2003).
150. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Specifically, the PATRIOT Act amended the freezing and
blocking powers of the OFAC to permit it to
investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in,
or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
151. Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1(d)(i), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
152. See50U.S.C.§ 1702(c).
153. Bush "We will starve the terrorists," CNN.COM, Sept. 24, 2001,
http://archives.
cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/. Although SDGTs are the most common
designation adopted by the government against terrorists, it is not the only one. Executive
Order Number 13,224 also created a category of "specially designated terrorists," or SDTs, and
before September 11-before the days when OFAC was freezing the assets of suspected
individual terrorists-it developed a category of "foreign terrorist organizations" ("FTOs") in
the 1990s, many of whom it is now recharacterizing as SDGTs. Exec. Order No. 13,224 §
I (d) (i), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079. The most recent version of the list is available on the OFAC's
website. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals, http://www.treas.
gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). The PATRIOT Act
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13,224 defined SDGTs to include foreign terrorists; anyone who "assist[s] in,
sponsor[s], or provide[s] financial, material, or technological support for
. . . or other services to or in support
of' terrorism; and also agents or
154
persons associated with these terrorists.
But while the reach of the SDGT regulations is broad, making a case for
an asset freeze is not correspondingly deep. 155 The initial freeze of assets and
property is, as the 9/11 Commission staff put it, "contingent on the signing
of a piece of paper"-a blocking order pending investigation-by the
director of OFAC, a mid-level government official, without any further
administrative process or review. 156 No warrant is required for the
procedure, which, pursuant to the PATRIOT Act, is often initiated at the

and new Executive Order added a new structure to an already extant counterterrorism
financing regime. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947, pursuant to the
IEEPA, which designated certain terrorist organizations "Specially Designated Terrorists" and
blocked all of their property and interests in property. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed Reg.
5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). The order also allowed for additional designations if an organization or
person were found to be "owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of' a specially
designated terrorist. Id. The State Department handled FfO designations, though all FTOs
have since been designated as SDGTs as well. For an overview, see Nicole Nice-Petersen, supra
note 140, at 1387-90.
154. Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1(d) (i), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079; see also NinaJ. Crimm, High
Alert: The Government's War on The FinancingOf Terrorism and its Implicationsfor Donors, Domestic
CharitableOrganizations, and Global Philanthropy,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1370-73 (2004);
Nina J. Crimm, Post-September 11 Fortified Anti-Terrorism Measures Compel Heightened Due Diligence,
25 PACE L. REv. 203 (2005) (reviewing developments in the financial regulation of terrorism,
with particular attention to the compliance required by regulated industry).
155. As Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar has noted, "Even when executive branch officials
discuss asset freezes, they describe the basis for an asset freeze as merely a 'belief' (which is
consistent with the broad discretion provided by the statute)." Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, The
Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in TransnationalLaw Enforcement, 22 BERKELEYJ.
INT'L L. 15, 38 n.90 (2004).
156.

9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 112 ("This

provision lets the government shut down an organization without any formal determination of
wrongdoing. It requires a single piece of paper, signed by a midlevel government official."). To
be sure, OFAC officials describe the designation process as subject to some degree of internal
review. As the agency's director testified to Congress,
A completed OFAC evidentiary record on a particular target is submitted first for
legal review, then to the Executive Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial
Crimes, where OFAC officers work with that office to prepare the package for the
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). The PCC determines whether the USC
should designate a particular entity or should pursue alternative legal or
diplomatic strategies in order to achieve U.S. interests. As part of the PCC process,
OFAC's designation proposal will usually be vetted by the consultative parties
specified by the EO [No. 13,224].
Oversight of the Department of Treasury: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on FinancialServices, 108th Cong. (June 16, 2004) (prepared statement of Richard
Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Dep't of Treasury) [hereinafter
Newcomb Testimony], availableat http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1729.htm.
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outset, rather than the culmination, of an investigation into whether SDGT
targets are associated with terrorism. 57
The remedy for those whose assets have been blocked during the
pendency of an investigation lies in administrative or judicial review of the
designation order. 58 But the preliminary nature of the government action,
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review of agency "freezures," 159 the
overlay of deference in national-security matters, and the ability of the
agency to keep much of the record for review classified, makes review likely
to fail.' i ° We are aware of no cases where plaintiffs have successfully
challenged a designation and an OFAC blocking order since the advent of
the war on terror.l 6 Reviews of OFAC's post-investigation actions have a
more checkered history in the courts-it is then that SDGTs can bring
claims challenging the legality and sufficiency of the designation-but there,
157. See, e.g.,
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2002). In this
case, the court noted,
On December 14, 2001, the Secretary used the delegated authority to block all
assets of Global Relief Foundation, Inc., an Illinois charitable corporation that
conducts operations in approximately 25 foreign entities.... [T]he blocking order
was an interim step pending investigation. The freeze on December 14 was
accompanied by a search of GRF's headquarters.
Id. Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (Sept. 12,
2006) (testimony of Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dept. of
the Treasury), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp92.htm ("In February
2004, federal agents executed a search warrant on Al Haramain, pursuant to a joint
investigation by IRS-CI, the FBI, and DHS/ICE. Simultaneously, Treasury's OFAC blocked the
accounts of the organization pending investigation, freezing the organization's assets in
place."); see also OFAC Recent Actions, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
actions/ (last visited Jan 25, 2007) (listing, among other actions, "blocked pending
investigation," or BPI, actions between 2000-2006).
158. See Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (describing the standard of review of designation decisions).
159. They are "freezures" because the government seems to seize the asset, but, as the
government has argued, not in a way that implicates the Fourth Amendment's search and
seizure provisions because it does not search the property it has frozen. Holy Land Found. for
Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2002).
160. Indeed, the OFAC has taken the position that blocking orders pending investigation
are not final agency action ripe for review. Global Relief Found, 315 F.3d at 751 ("[A]ppellees'
suggestion of mootness is that GRF's current requests are limited to its status pending final
administrative resolution."). In a similar vein, the viability of novel constitutional claims that
defendants may be able to dream up makes judicial review problematic.
161. As the district court noted in the Holy Land Foundationlitigation, "If [OFAC's] reasons
and policy choices . . . conform to certain minimal standards of rationality . . . the rule is

reasonable and must be upheld." Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 67; Islamic Am. Relief &
Dev. v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2005) ("This Court recognizes
that the plaintiff is at an inherent disadvantage as it is not able to review and analyze the
administrative record in its entirety, but rather is limited only to those portions of the
administrative record that are not classified."). For an example of the kinds of claims that
charities have raised against the OFAC, see Complaint at 11 39-48, Benevolence Int'l Found.,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Il1. 2002) (No. 02 C 0763), available at http://files.
findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/bifashcroft013002cmp.pdf.
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too, OFAC enjoys the benefits of deferential Administrative Procedures Act
("APA") review.

162

Since September 11, OFAC has issued a regular series of lists of SDGTs
and their alleged supporters. 163 As of 2004, the agency had designated 375
individuals or entities as SDGTs. 164 In the four months that followed
September 11 alone, the agency listed 157 suspects and froze assets valued at
$68 million.165 By 2004, Treasury Department officials were crowing that they
had frozen $200 million in assets since September 11.166
Perhaps most notably, the Treasury announced investigations of a
number of charities based in the United States and subsequently froze all of
their property. Because these actions against charities were high-profile and
particularly big-dollar asset freezes, we use OFAC's record against charities
as a yardstick for evaluating the effectiveness of this civil administrative
mechanism of terror-fighting.
2.

Inexpertise

The sort of regulation that OFAC has been called upon to do since
September 11 is nothing like the regulation that the office was created to
implement. The agency began as an administrative office that distributed
export licenses and ensured that banks did not release the assets of foreign
countries with whom the United States was at war.167 It was created after
World War II to enforce the dictates of the Trading with the Enemy Act
("TWEA") 16 8-and
had, until the 1990s, defined "enemy" as nations with

162.

Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162 ("[T]he actions of the Treasury Department in

designating HLF as a SDGT are governed by the judicial review provisions of the APA." (citing 5

U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000))). Under that statute, the government receives particularly strong
deference for national-security-related actions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1) (2000) (exempting
rulemaking done pursuant to "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States" from
informal rulemaking requirements); Id. § 552(b)(1)(A) (exempting government-generated
information "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" from disclosure requirements).
163. The OFAC lists its enforcement actions at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/actions/index.shtml.
164. Newcomb Testimony, supra note 156.
165. Kevin Johnson, Fewer TerrorAssets Frozen; "Lack of Urgency" Feared in Effort, USA TODAY,
Jan. 30, 2006, at Al. The pace of designation and asset freezes has since slowed somewhat, and
annual freeze-order takes declined to $4.9 million in 2005. Id.
166. Combating InternationalTerrorist Financing:Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 53 (2004) (statement of
Honorable Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury), available at www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1971.htm (claiming
that the OFAC had "seized over $200 million of terrorist-related funds worldwide").
167. In its early history, the OFAC was described as "a minor Treasury Department bureau."
Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J.,
concurring).
168. As one commentator explained:
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whom the United States was at war, either cold or hot. 169 OFAC oversaw the
limits on trade with these nations and ensured that the assets of the adverse
country located in the United States were not repatriated. 170 The office
focused on states like Cuba. Between 1990 and 2003, OFAC conducted
10,683 Cuba-related investigations and imposed $8 million in fines between
1990 and 2003. By comparison, during the same period, OFAC 71conducted
93 investigations into terrorists and imposed only $9,425 in fines.'
But beginning in the 1990s, and rapidly accelerating after September
11, OFAC has shifted its focus from countries to individuals, most notably
individuals and organizations inside the United States. 172 With OFAC's new
responsibilities has come hypertrophied growth. Between 1986 and 2004,
the office expanded from ten employees to 144, while its budget has
increased from almost nothing to $22 million per year.' OFAC now blocks
74
asset transfers of at least $1 million, and as much as $35 million, per week.'
To assist OFAC, the Treasury has created an75Office of Intelligence Analysis,
which helps to prepare the cases on SDGTs.'
In placing new assets, including many non-financial assets, in the hands
of financial regulators, this new scheme has put the agency in the odd
position
of overseeing-indeed,
dispossessing-organizations
and
individuals that the government has concluded promote or support

The statutory basis for U.S. economic sanctions in the twentieth century dates back
to the enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) in 1917, six months
after the United States entered World War I. As originally enacted, the TWEA gave
the President broad powers in times of war to regulate or prohibit transactions
involving property in which a foreign country or national thereof had any interest.
The TWEA was subsequently amended in 1933 to give the President authority to
exercise his TWEA powers in response to peace-time national emergencies.
StanleyJ. Marcuss, Gristfor the Litigation Mill in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs,30 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 501-02 (1999); see also Rudolph Lehrer, Comment, Unbalancing the Terrorists'
Checkbook: Analysis of U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on International Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 333, 336 (2002) (discussing the history of the scheme).
169. The United States also imposed sanctions pursuant to the foreign-policy-exportcontrol authority contained in the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-20 (2000).
See Marcuss, supra note 168, at 502 (discussing this statutory scheme).
170. For a history of the OFAC's sanctions regime, see Marcuss, supranote 168, at 501.
171.
Laura K. Donahue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27
MICH.J. INT'L L. 303, 379 n.349 (2006) (citing newspaper and government reports).
172. See supra notes 153-166 and accompanying text.
173. See David Ivanovich, Oil-For-Food Fiasco Spotlights Agency, Secretive Unit of the Treasury Is
Responsible for Keeping Economic Sanctions in Place, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2006, at A8, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/3686135.html; Newcomb Testimony, supra
note 156.
174. SeeNewcomb Testimony, supra note 156.
175. See U. S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, http://www.ustreas.
gov/offices/enforcement/oia/ (last visitedJan. 24, 2007).
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terrorism--or, at least, those who are worth investigating further for those
6
reasons-and on prosecuting, rather than cooperating, with regulateds.
The charitable cases exemplify the new responsibilities with which the
agency has been tasked. Those responsibilities have placed the agency in the
role of investigating ordinary Americans for links with terrorism, taking
control of the property of those people it suspects might be so linked, and,
in some cases, overseeing and running the property that it takes. It is all a
very new role for banking regulators.
Three months after September 11, OFAC took over three Islamic
charities, including the two largest in America. These three charities
provided money to a diverse set of beneficiaries, including, of course, a
number of worthy causes.17 7 But not all the links the charities created with
the Islamic world were suspicionless. The Holy Land Foundation was a
principally Palestinian-oriented institution, and its critics accused it of
supporting Hamas, a Palestinian organization linked with terrorism. 178 The
director of the Benevolence International Foundation ultimately admitted
to supplying non-military goods to Chechen and Bosnian rebels. 7 9 And the
Global Relief Agency had been linked to the Taliban-controlled

176. "The actual effectiveness of the OFAC's regulatory programs . .. is much more
dependant upon voluntary implementation and compliance with its rules by the regulated
community than on the agency's own enforcement actions." Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing
"Smart Sanctions"Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 957, 964 (2002).
177. The charities focused most of their efforts on providing short and long-term relief to
Muslim victims of natural disasters. See notes 157-62 (providing specific examples of the causes
taken on by the Holy Land Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, and the
Global Relief Foundation).
178. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was a charity headquartered
in Richardson, Texas. Adam Lisberg, FBI Probes 2 Muslim Charities inNorth Jersey; Looking for Links
to Terror Groups, THE REc. (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 6, 2001, at A18. The charity's main
objective was to help Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, but it provided humanitarian aid
and relief to individuals and communities (primarily Muslim and Arab) in other Middle Eastern
countries and the United States. Id. For example, in 2000, the charity raised $13 million to help
Turkish earthquake victims and Muslim refugees in Kosovo and Albania, while also operating
food pantries in places like Paterson, NewJersey. Id.
179. The Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF") was a U.S. tax-exempt, not-forprofit organization whose stated purpose was to conduct humanitarian relief projects
throughout the world. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Pub. Affairs, Treasury
Designates Benevolence International Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of
Terrorism (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3632.htm
[hereinafter Treasury Designates]. The organization's website claimed to help "those afflicted
by wars... providing short-term relief such as emergency food distribution, and then moves on
to long term projects providing education and self-sufficiency to the children, widowed,
refugees, injured and staff of vital governmental institutions." Rotten.com, Benevolence
International Foundation, http://www.rotten.com/library/history/terrorist-organizations/b-if/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). The BIF was incorporated in Illinois on March 30, 1992, and has
operated around the world, in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan, China, Ingushetia,
and Russia. Treasury Designates, supra. On November 19, 2002, the group was classified as a
terrorist group financier by the United States Department of Treasury. Id.
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S180
Afghanistan, among other countries.
Later, pending investigation, OFAC
moved to freeze the assets of Al-Barakat, an organization primarily devoted
to Africa, though the agency later acknowledged that it could find no
evidence linking the organization to terrorism. 11 In 2004, OFAC froze the
assets of the Islamic American Relief Foundation, an African-centered
charity,1s2 and the U.S. branch of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a
Saudi charity.8 3 Most recently, OFAC blocked,
pending investigation, access
184
to the assets of KindHearts, a Toledo charity.
Each of these Islamic charities-all with multi-million dollar budgets
and varied programs in a number of countries-had all of their property
frozen, from bank accounts to offices and the supplies within them. In the
Holy Land Foundation freezure, OFAC removed all of the furniture from
the charity's offices. 8 5 In the case of the Benevolence International
l6
Foundation, OFAC seized personal computers as well as business records. 8
After designating AI-Barakat as a SDGT, as one Treasury Department official
explained, "Treasury agents ended up shutting down
eight al Barakat offices
18 7
in the United States"-mistakenly, as it turned OUt.

180. The Global Relief Foundation ("GRF"), also known as Fondation Secours Mondial, or
FSM, was an Islamic charity based in Bridgeville, Illinois until it was raided and shut down on
December 14, 2001 and labeled a "specifically-designated global terrorist" by the U.S. Treasury
Department in 2002. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Pub. Affairs, Treasury
Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation (Oct. 18,
2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3553.htm. Before being shut
down, the group claimed its mission was to provide care, support, and relief to people in need
throughout the world. Id.
181. For an analysis of the benighted Al-Barakat investigation, see 9/11 COMMISSION
TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 67-86.

182. Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C.
2005) (upholding designation of charity). The Islamic American Relief Agency was formerly
called the Islamic Relief Agency (IARA). Id. at 39. For the government's announcement of its
action against IARA, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Pub. Affairs, Treasury
Designates Global Network, Senior Officials of IARA for Supporting bin Laden, Others (Oct.
13, 2004), available at http:// www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2025.htm, and for a critical
analysis, see A1-Marayati, supra note 140, at 327.
183. A-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 2006).
184. Jihad M. Smaili, Council on American Islamic Relations, Statement by Kind Hearts
(Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=39012&theType=
NB.
185. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (N.D. Tex.
2002) ("OFAC . . . removed from HLF headquarters, all documents, computers, and
furniture.").
186. Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936-37 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
187. Jimmy Gurule, Under Sec'y of Treasury for Enforcement, Briefing to Foreign Press
Center: Update on Tracking the Financial Assets of Terrorists: One Year Later (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/13337.htm.
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This civil process became decidedly novel after OFAC officials had
88
taken possession of the charities because they then had to operate them.1
OFAC has had to decide whether to permit the charities that it has
dispossessed to cover basic operating expenses like rent or attorneys' fees. 8 9
It has had to evaluate requests to apply the frozen funds to new charities, to
decide whether to distribute religious literature impounded in the
freezure,190 and to venture into the housing market to satisfy the tax bills of
those whose assets have been frozen.''
In freezing the assets of charities, OFAC did not move against financial
institutions at all and found itself engaging in activities that looked a lot like
criminal law enforcement, albeit without the usual protections of criminal
procedure. The dramatic effect that it had on Muslim charities in Americaall of the charities seized have been paralyzed-is attributable, in part, to the
strange relationship between OFAC's civil powers and quasi-criminal
responsibilities.
3.

Overdiscretion

Inexpertise is not the only problem that OFAC has faced in
administering its new rules. Observers, including the 9/11 Commission staff,
have expressed concerns about the problems inherent in OFAC asset freezes
due to their heavy effects and light process.192 Because OFAC can destroy

188. For example, the OFAC must decide whether to pay creditors of the charity. Pamela
M. Keeney, Comment, Frozen Assets of Terrorists and Terrorist Supporters: A Proposed Solution to the
Creditor Collection Problem, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 301, 301-09 (2004) (noting that asset freezes
prevent creditors of the freeze targets from collecting their debts).
189. See Complaint at 25-26, Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(No. 02C 763); see also Anne Beck & Sylvia Tonova, Note, No Legal Representation Without
Governmental "Interposition," 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 598 (2004) (discussing Executive
Order No. 13,304, which prohibited the contribution of services to those whose funds had been
blocked, and the effect on attorneys representing such clients); Jill M. Troxel, Note, Office of
Foreign Assets Control Regulations: Making Attorneys Choose Between Compliance and the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 24 REv. LITIG. 637, 640-51 (2005) (discussing OFAC regulations regulating the
attorney-client relationship by expressly prohibiting some legal services and requiring a license
for others).
190. See Complaint, at 1 9, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Ashcroft, No. 06 CV 583MO (on
file with the Iowa Law Review) (seeking distribution of "thousands of volumes of religious
literature, including Qur'ans, written commentary on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and
other materials designed to explain Islam to both adherents and non-adherents").
191.
Mark Freeman, Seda Home Sold, MAIL TRIB. (Medford, Or.), May 5, 2006, at 5, available
at http://www.mailtribune.com/archive/2006/0505/local/stories/5maysedahousesold.htm.
192.

9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 112. The

staff report found:
Although in practice a number of agencies typically review and agree to the action,
there is no formal administrative process, let alone any adjudication of guilt.
Although this provision is necessary in rare emergencies when the government
must shut down a terrorist financier before OFAC can marshal evidence to support
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any entity with its freeze-before-investigation powers, and because
designation decisions are not subject to much review, the post-September 11
agency has become a case study in overdiscretion.
The broad discretion afforded to OFAC has been exacerbated by a
failure of executive-branch supervision and an unwillingness to define its
new regulatory powers with precision. The result has been freezures that
have failed to result in counterterrorism prosecutions
but that have
93
negatively affected charitable donations by Muslims.

It is not clear that OFAC's supervisors have been able to keep up with
everything the agency has been doing in the post-September 11 explosion of
its business. In October, the Government Accountability Office concluded
that the Treasury Department "lacks meaningful performance
measures to
194
assess its terrorist designation and asset blocking efforts."
Moreover, OFAC has not been willing to limit its discretion by providing
guidance as to what exactly constitutes dealing with SDGTs-a degree of
vagueness that has become a tradition with the agency. 195 As we will see, this
vagueness has particularly burdened would-be Islamic donors who have
expressed exasperation
and confusion as to which charities are at risk for
96
freezure orders.

The results have been predictably unimpressive. Like most terrorist
actions, the September 11 attack was a low-tech, inexpensive operation, and
efforts to freeze the assets of charities that, at best, tenuously were linked to
al Qaeda have been, at the very least, controversial. " The 9/11 Commission
has explained that so far, the asset freezes that have been enacted

a formal designation, serious consideration should be given to placing a strict and
short limit on the duration of such a temporary blocking.
Id.; see also AI-Marayati, supra note 140, at 334 (arguing that the freezes have victimized Muslims

who had nothing to do with terror). For an early critique of the large discretion the OFAC was
afforded in designations even before September 11, see Peter L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights
Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This" Blacklisting and Due Process

in U.S. Economic SanctionsPrograms,51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 110-15 (1999).
193. Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, supra note 186, only resulted in one non-terrorismrelated guilty plea, see supra note 179 and accompanying text, while the Global Relief
Foundation was never prosecuted. See generally Neil McFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving
by U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at Al ("Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence at Treasury Dept has shuttered five major Muslim charities in US since 2001,
seizing millions of dollars in assets, but not one officer or organization has been convicted of
anything." ).
194. KevinJohnson, supra note 165, at Al (quoting the GAO report).
195. Ivanovich, supra note 173 ("OFAC experts say the agency keeps its rules vague.").
196. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
197. In the words of the Commission:
Nothing the hijackers did would have alerted any bank personnel to their being
criminals, let alone terrorists bent on mass murder. Their transactions were
routine and caused no alarm. Their wire transfers, in amounts from $5,000 to
$70,000, were utterly anonymous in the billions of dollars moving through the
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were undertaken with limited evidence, and some were overbroad,
resulting in legal challenges. Faced with having to defend actions
in courts that required a higher standard of evidence than was
provided by the intelligence that supported the designations in the
first place, the United States... [was] forced to "unfreeze" assets. 198
The result of affording OFAC so much discretion to freeze assetsespecially to freeze assets pending investigation-is that control over the
important decisions to freeze has been delegated down. This putatively
crucial component of the war on terrorism has been administered by midlevel bureaucrats in the Treasury Department who have been given the
authority to interpret very broad grants of authority.
4.

Fit

Although OFAC's conduct in the war on terror is most obviously a
problem of inexpert banking supervisors taking on a law enforcement role,
exacerbated by a failure to adequately constrain the agency, perhaps the
most troubling aspect of the agency's fight against terrorism is the change in
focus within the agency. Previously, it monitored a regulated industry to
ensure that Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and other foreign powers did not
make use of American financial institutions; now, its regulatory purview
reaches far beyond banking.19 9 As the post-September 11 executive order has
made clear, OFAC now has the capacity to impose extraordinarily serious
regulatory punishment on anyone, domestic or foreign, suspected of
association with terrorists.200 However, it is by no means clear that the
agency's supervision of a regulated industry has made it capable of searching
for elusive links with terrorism among not just regulateds, but all Americans.
5.

The Effect on Proxies

OFAC's sanctions depend on a second-order form of regulation of
terrorists that consists of imposing watch requirements on institutions that
the terrorists might use. But it is unlikely that terrorists will use charities or
banks in an open, public way, nor is it clear that terrorists need the ability to
move and launder substantial funds through banks or other institutions. 0 1
international financial system on a daily basis. Their bank transactions, typically
large deposits followed by many small ATM or credit card withdrawals, were
entirely normal, especially for foreign students living in the United States. No
financial institution filed a suspicious activity report (SAR) and, even with benefit
of hindsight, none of them should have.
9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supranote 141, at 53.
198.

Id. at 47.

199. For the OFAC's history, see supra,notes 146-66.
200. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (discussing terrorists' financial
transactions).
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Thus, OFAC has become a heavy-handed regulator of proxies for terrorists
with little evidence of efficacy. 202 Two proxies in particular have been
affected: Muslims and financial institutions.
The part of the public most burdened by the new OFAC designations
has been American Muslims, who are obligated by their religion to give to
charity, but who have found their donations after September 11 to be
fraught with new risks. 203 The reaction of Islamic advocacy groups has been
204
predictably negative.
Moreover, as the number of individuals and organizations designated
has grown, the record-keeping burdens on the banks-and, indeed, anyone
who works with money 25-have
grown. On January 12, 2006, OFAC issued
guidance to banks for compliance with its requirements. The guidance
requires banks to implement internal controls for identifying suspicious
accounts and transactions, including a set of written procedures for new
accounts, old accounts, and all transactions; a testing process of the
compliance program; the designation of a "compliance officer" responsible
for the day-to-day oversight of the OFAC compliance program; and the
creation of a training program. 206 The penalties imposed by OFAC for
failure to comply with these requirements range from the low five figures to
over one-million dollars. 207 Since 1993, OFAC has collected nearly $30
million for compliance program violations. 208
OFAC's new guidance to financial institutions gives a sense of the
amount of work banks are supposed to do to identify and find SDGT
transactions. The Department ofJustice has admitted that "OFAC sanctions
are constantly changing and complex." 2 9 A laundry list of consultants-

202.

See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effectiveness of

these regulations.

203.

This charitable obligation is known as Zakat and is rooted in the Koran. For a

discussion, see generally AI-Marayati, supra note 140.
204.
See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 111
(discussing this reaction); Sakeena Mirza & Ameena Qazi, Robbing the Poor, 12 AL-TALIB (Los
Angeles), http://www.al-talib.com/articles/vl2 i3 a04.htm (last visited May 25, 2007) (same).
205. This includes those who work informally with money. As the OFAC has said, "All U.S.
persons must comply with the OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citizens and permanent
resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons and entities within the United
States, all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches." OFAC, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/shtml#1 (last visited May, 10,
2007). There are no de minimis transactions permitted with designated entities.
206. Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, orJewels, 31
C.F.R. § 103.140 (2006); see also Joel Feinberg, OFAC Issues Interim Final Rule Describing Sound
Compliance Program, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Jan. 26, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 1431613.
207. Newcomb Testimony, supranote 156.
208. Id.
209. Lester M. Joseph, Anti-Money Laundering Update, 1378 PLI/CORP 627, 656 (2003)
(describing the OFAC regime by offering the perspective of a senior criminal prosecutor in the
Department ofJustice).
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ranging from linguistic psychologists to computer-savvy data-miners-have
tried to fill this gap by developing programs and training opportunities
designed to help financial institutions keep track of the growing lists of
individuals. 2 But such programs are, of course, expensive.
Moreover, compliance is not just an issue for financial institutions. It is
also an issue for a broad array of domestic entities never before subject to
the agency's control. Consider the difficulties of compliance with new
guidance-rare guidance, for OFAC-to charities, the proxies that OFAC
has regulated particularly severely in the hopes of catching terrorists. OFAC
has suggested the adoption of a "risk-based" approach to the monitoring of
charitable aid recipients. 211 Charities have been directed to conduct "due
diligence" of their recipients (as well as of the charities' own personnel) to
ensure that they are not on OFAC-generated watch lists, to provide donors
with some information about the identities of their aid recipients and the
use to which the aid will be put, and to continue to monitor recipients after
the aid has been given.212
These putatively voluntary guidelines for charities, in imposing a
number of reporting and bookkeeping requirements to ensure that they do
not become conduits for terrorist money, are similar to the requirements
OFAC imposes on more traditional subjects of its regulation, such as
banks. 2" Furthermore, as with banks, the government has made no
guarantees that compliance with the guidelines will exempt charities from
prosecution for money laundering.1 4 The department has also issued "best
practices ,,215 that charitable organizations might follow. This might create

210. Choicepoint is one of the best known data-miners. But see also OFAC Compliance,
http://www.las-inc.com/ofac/ofac-compliance.shtml (last visited May 10, 2007) (asking
whether financial institutions are "Struggling with Assessing OFAC Compliance Software" and
offering the service of linguists and psychologists in the name-matching process).
211.
See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based
Charities, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,063, 73,063 (Dec. 8, 2005) (announcing an intention "to assist
charities in developing a risk-based approach to guard against the threat of diversion of
charitable funds for use by terrorists and their support networks"); see alsoJoseph W. Younker,
The "U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist FinancingGuidelines: Voluntary Best-Practicesfor
U.S.-Based Charities":Sawing A Leg Off the Stool of Democracy, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
865, 866 (2004) (calling for "a flexible, risk-based test more in tune with the reality of the
nonprofit sector").
212.

U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST

PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES 6 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs/guidelines-charities.pdf.
213. Id.
214. At any rate, the Department warned the charities that compliance with its guidelines
should "not be construed to preclude any criminal or civil sanctions by the Department." Id at
1.
215. Id.
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consistency across charities, but there is no
indication that it would result in
216
a particularly desirable regulatory regime.
6.

Conclusion

The Treasury Department continues to designate individuals under the
SDGT process. Indeed, it has paired its domestic process with an
international one, persuading the United Nations and American allies to
also designate individuals and organizations as subjects of global asset
freezes. 2 17 Still, it is worth considering the results of this new form of action

by the Treasury Department so far.
It is unclear that any of the charities taken over by OFAC actually
supported terrorism in any way other than incidentally and accidentally, if
even that.218 In no case have the charity "freezures" been followed by

successful prosecutions for violating the criminal laws against terrorismalthough one charity official pled guilty to providing nonmilitary goods to
Chechen and Bosnian rebels, neither of which, of course, were responsible
for the attacks of September 11.219
This is not surprising. As the 9/11 Commission staff explained, the
earlier designation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in 1999 as "Foreign
Terrorist Organizations" did not prevent the World Trade Center attack. As
the Commission noted, "the sanctions ... were easily circumvented," and it
is surpassingly difficult to "find [ ] and
seiz[e] the funds of a clandestine
22 0
worldwide organization like al Qaeda."
To the extent that the regulations are effective at all, their effectiveness
probably lies primarily in the sense that the government is doing something
about terrorism when it freezes assets through the low-cost, lightly reviewed
designation process. 221 Sanctions like those administered by OFAC "are

216. See generally David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 (2006) (discussing bestpractices rulemaking, its origins in business management, and an analysis of how it works in the
public sector).
217. US. Department of the Treasury Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 108th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2004) (statement of Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary, Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence) [hereinafter Levey Testimony], available at http://banking.senate.
gov/_files/ACF4BE6.pdf.
218. As the 9/11 Commission staff noted, "A senior government official who led the
government's efforts against terrorist financing from 9/11 until late 2003 believed the efforts
against the charities were less than a full success and, in fact, were a disappointment because
neither charity was publicly proved to support terrorism." 9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST
FINANCING MONOGRAPH,

supra note 141, at 111.

219. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
220. 9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 181.
221. As Mariano-Florentino Cullar has noted, in order to "appear [ I to be doing
something constructive to reduce a threat" an executive branch official may be tempted to use
his "power regardless of whether there is the capacity to target the sanctions at the most
deserving of targets" in the absence of the capacity to impose substantial costs on the most
troubling offenders, or to detect them." Cudllar, supra note 155, at 44, 46.
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frequently imposed to demonstrate political leadership or to claim the
moral high ground for domestic or international political purposes." 22 That
process has also proven to be a surprisingly attractive means of obtaining
international cooperation in that the United Nations and American allies
have been willing to announce freezes of any assets of designated individuals
located in their jurisdictions. 223 Ironically, these internationally focused
benefits, meager though they are, are the aspects of terrorism-financing
regulation most closely related to OFAC's original mission.
B. FINCENAND THE HIGH COST OFSEARCHING FOR MONEYLAUNDERERS

The government has tried to prevent criminals from laundering their
ill-gotten gains for decades, and this anti-money laundering regime has
always been administered by banking regulators in the Department of the
Treasury. In this Article, we have argued that civil administrative agencies
usually fight the war on terror badly. Can this possibly be true for a
government agency that has been running comparable civil investigations
against criminals for decades?
In our view, it is. While the regulation of banks to prevent money
laundering is not a new administrative task, the post-September 11 regime
illustrates the perils of the hasty expansion of regulation-a case of
overreaction that has particularly exacerbated the problems of fit and
overdiscretion that, along with the problem of inexpertise, typically
characterize the results of sending bureaucrats to war. After September 11,
banking regulators have rushed into a scheme that substantially affects a set
of proxies for terrorists-financial institutions-without any indication that
the terrorists themselves have been affected.
1.

The Regulatory Scheme, and How It Changed After September 11

There was little that was secret about the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
("BSA"), which was passed to prevent tax evaders and criminals from hiding
or laundering their taxable or ill-gotten assets in federally regulated banks. 225
In the years that followed, banks and other federally regulated financial

222.
223.

Fitzgerald, supra note 176, at 961.
See Laura Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 426 (2006) (noting that a number of states, along with the United
Nations, have started designating individuals and warning that "[t]he United States' refusal to
allow any sort of independent arbitration to accompany the creation of lists substantially
weakened the UN attempt to build a dossier of dangerous individuals, and that the lack of such
a structure opens the door to abuse from other states").
224. As some observers have claimed, "economic sanctions are frequently the government's
first and principal tool to deal with international terrorism." Jonathan Grebinar, Note,
Responding to Terrorism:How Must a Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and American Law, 31
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 261, 280 (2003).
225. See Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26-30 (1974) (discussing these and the
other concerns Congress tried to address in the Bank Secrecy Act).
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institutions were required to report to the Department of the Treasury on
large or otherwise suspicious transactions. 2 6
After September 11, the BSA was amended by the PATRIOT Act to
expand the reach of the criminal sanctions against money laundering 227 to
permit the Treasury Department to pursue civil penalties against alleged
launderers 228 and, most notably, to increase the reporting requirements on,
and broaden the definition of, financial institutions subject to the
requirements of the Act. 229 Congressional leaders and executive officials
claimed that these new laws were designed to stem the flow of money to
230
terrorists.
226. For a description of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") in the
pre-September 11 era, see Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age
Economy, 34JURIMETRICSJ. 383, 386-400 (1994).

227.

Among other things, it expanded the number of predicate penalties for a money

laundering charge, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. 2005), and it criminalized the transportation of
bulk cash, 31 U.S.C § 5311. It also made the operation of an unlicensed money-transfer business
a general, rather than a specific, intent crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (Supp. 1960). It added the
provision of monetary support to the list of crimes under the anti-terrorism act.
228.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (Supp. 2005). Under this statute, any person who engages or
attempts to engage in a transaction involving more than $10,000 in criminally derived proceeds
may be held civilly liable for the value of the proceeds or $10,000, whichever is greater. The
statute contains a long-arm jurisdiction provision, via which, a foreign "person" is now subject to
jurisdiction for a forfeiture action, as long as personal service can be effected and one of the
following conditions is met: (1) the money laundering offense involved a financial transaction
that occurred in whole or part in the United States; (2) the foreign person (including a foreign
bank) converts property in which the United States has an interest by virtue of a forfeiture
order of a U.S. court; or (3) the foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank
account at a financial institution in the United States. Id.
229.
For an exhaustive discussion of these new requirements, see Robert W. Helm & Kevin
K. Babikian, Creating,Managing and DistributingOffshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, in
NUTS AND BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2005, at 715, 964 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 6348, 2005) ("The USA PATRIOT Act required the Treasury Department
to extend CTR reporting requirements under the [Bank Secrecy Act] to all trades and
businesses-not just financial institutions."). The statue also permits federal authorities to share
information with financial institutions about the potential targets of investigation. See 67 Fed.
Reg. 60,579 (Sep. 26, 2002) (setting forth the implementing regulations for this process).
FinCEN reports that it has processed 167 such requests for information by federal agencies
between February 1, 2003, and December 6, 2005. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep't of
Treasury, FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheet.
12062005.html.
230.
See Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the Anti-Money
LaunderingProvisions of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes) ("The United States
must lead both by example and by promoting concerted international action. Our goal must be
not only to apprehend particular individuals, but to cut off the pathways in the international
financial system along which terrorist and other criminal elements move money."); id.
(statement of Representative John J. LaFalce) ("[T]he Treasury Secretary's new, more flexible
anti-money laundering powers will enable law enforcement to tackle with much more
effectiveness abuses of our financial system by criminals and terrorists"); id. (statement of the
Honorable Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice) ("Tide III of the USA PATRIOT Act has provided law enforcement with important new
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The result has been a repurposing of the part of the Treasury
Department that implements the money laundering regulations. The
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, has been transformed
from an office that tracked the financial transactions of criminals into one
that looks, in principal part, for similar transactions by terrorists. 3'
FinCEN has implemented this new regulatory mandate by scrutinizing
the reports and recordkeeping of banks and other financial institutions.232
In theory, it looks for a financial trail that will lead investigators and
prosecutors to terrorists.2 33 But in practice, much of what the agency does
involves the policing of the report-filing programs of the financial
institutions covered by the BSA and the PATRIOT Act.
Because the new regulatory regime substantially expanded the number
of institutions subject to the money laundering reporting requirements,
tracking the reporting is a big job. The PATRIOT Act and its implementing
regulations expanded the number of financial institutions subject to
reporting requirements, which for the first time covered credit unions,
futures commission merchants, commodity trading advisors, commodity
pool operators, and informal or unlicensed transmitters of money. 34 That
last category means that BSA reporting requirements now apply to
pawnbrokers, loan circles, hawalas, and, possibly, any other person who

authority to investigate and prosecute the financing of crime, including terrorism."). For more
background, see United States v. Wray, No. CR. 2002-53, 2002 WIL 31628435, at *2 n.5 (D. Virgin
IslandsJune 17, 2002).
231.
Treasury Order No. 105-08. In May 1994, its mission was broadened to include
regulatory responsibilities. For more views on money laundering, see generally Michael P.
Malloy, Unfunding Terror-Perspectiveson Unfunding Terror, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 97 (2004); Bruce
Zargaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorismand Anti-Money LaunderingSchemes, 34 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 45 (2002).
232.
In this regard, FinCEN's work is concentrated on combining information reported
under the BSA with other government and public information. This information is then turned
over to law-enforcement officials, with the idea being that they can then build moneylaundering cases with that information. For an enthusiastic characterization of what the agency
is up to, see generally Cristina Jackson, Combating The New Generation of Money Laundering:
Regulations and Agencies in the Battle of Compliance, Avoidance, and Prosecution in a Post-September 11
World, 4J. HIGH TECH. L 139 (2004).Jackson states that
FinCEN also provides intelligence and analytical support to law enforcement: it
combines the reported information with information gathered from other
government origins and from the public to construct intelligence reports for its
customers .. .Its analysts provide direct and indirect case support to more than
300 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Id. at 150-51 (citations omitted).
233. FinCEN declares that its mission includes "[siupportinglaw enforcement, intelligence,
and regulatory agencies through sharing and analysis of financial intelligence." FinCEN, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, About FinCEN/Mission, http://www.fincen.gov/af_mission.html (last visited
May 10, 2007).
234.
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(E), (c) (1)(A) (2003).
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loans money to someone else.2s 5 Loan and finance companies are also
236
Moreover, the statute gives authority to the Treasury
expressly covered.
Department to expand further the types of institutions covered by the
reporting requirements.
Those subject to the Act's reach must file Suspicious Activity Reports
("SARs") with the Department of the Treasury.237 Also, all financial
institutions must establish anti-money laundering programs, including, as
one Department of Justice attorney has explained, "at a minimum, the
development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; the designation
of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee
training program; and an
238
programs.,
test
to
function
audit
independent
The Treasury Department has also issued specific minimum-standard
"know your customer" regulations pursuant to the PATRIOT Act. These
regulations require financial institutions to make "reasonable and practical"
efforts to verify new customers, maintain records of the information used to
verify them, and consult the lists of terrorists promulgated by OFAC. 239 Nor

are these the only requirements that FinCEN
has imposed on banks since
240
the promulgation of the PATRIOT Act.
235. The Act explicitly applies to "underground banking systems," which it defines as "a
business in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an
informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage in a business in
facilitating the transfer of money . . .outside the conventional financial institutions system."
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §359(c), 115 Stat. 272, 328-29 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §
5318 (2001)).
236. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a) (2), (c); Jeffrey P. Taft & Christina A. LaVera, The Changing
Landscape of Federal Money Laundering Laws: An Overview of the USA Patriot Act and Related
Development, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 109, 111 (2003) (describing the implementation of
this provision of the statute).
237. The Treasury Department has the authority to define financial institutions pursuant to
31 U.S.C. § 5312, which includes its own broad definition of the term. The statute itself provides
that "each financial institution shall establish anti-money laundering programs, including, at a
minimum(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls;
(B) the designation of a compliance officer;
(C) an ongoing employee training program; and
(D) an independent audit function to test programs."
31 U.S.C. § 5318(h).
238. Joseph, supra note 209.
239. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h). For more on the Customer Identification Program, see Taft &
LaVera, supra note 236, at 111.
240. For example, financial institutions are also now required to file Currency Trading
Forms to report transactions "relating to coins and currency received" as well. See William J.
Sweet, Jr., Saul M. Pilchen, & Stacie E. McGinn, Summary of the USA PatriotAct of 2001 Anti-Money
Laundering Provisions, in MONEY LAUNDERING UPDATE 2002: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 92 (PLI
Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No B-1337, 2002). On November 3, 2005, pursuant
to § 356 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN issued regulations requiring insurance companies
to establish and implement anti-money-laundering compliance programs and requiring
insurance companies to file suspicious activity reports ("SARs"). For a discussion, see AntiMoney Laundering, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GETPAGE&nodeld=
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Complying with FinCEN's regulatory regime, as was the case with
OFAC's scheme, is an involved process. The result is a cottage industry of
compliance consultants who offer software systems to track transactions,
outside training sessions, and experts who can advise covered financial
institutions as to what they must do to meet the Treasury Department's
standards. 241 U.S. banks spent about $125 million both in 2003 and 2004 to
comply with FinCEN's regulatory scheme. High-end estimates 2have
placed
4
the total costs of the money-laundering laws as $7 billion in 2003. 2
2.

Fit

But all of this civil regulation has done little to affect the fundamentally
non-civil nature of terrorism. We have used the term "fit" to show how the
characteristic form of civil rules-broadly applicable and dependent upon
voluntary compliance-are ill-suited for counterterrorism. FinCEN's
counterterrorism regime exemplifies the problems of fit because it has not
done much good. There is little evidence that the new administrative regime
has affected much of the money
laundered: 243 federal convictions for money
•
244
laundering
have not increased,
and investigations have a failure rate of
5
99.9%.24

As with OFAC's freezes, none of this is at all surprising. The 9/11
Commission staff concluded that "al Qaeda itself probably did not use the
formal financial system to store or transfer funds internally after Bin Ladin

646 (last visited May 10, 2007); see also Press Release, FinCEN, Insurance Companies Required

to Establish Anti-Money Laundering Programs and File Suspicious Activity Reports (Oct. 31,
2005), available at http://www.fincen.gov/newsrelease10312005.pdf. For the SARS themselves,
see FinCEN Advisories, http://www.fincen.gov/pub_main.html (last visited May 10, 2007). The
Treasury Department can also add to these reporting requirements in the cases where it is
particularly suspicious of a pattern of overseas money laundering. In such cases, it can order
domestic financial institutions to take "special measures," imposing additional tracking
requirements to the paper generated by these suspicious accounts.
241. For a description of this process, see supranotes 206-16 and accompanying text.
242.
See Karen Epper Hoffman, AML Security Emphasizes Detection and Prevention, BAI,
Jan./Feb. 2005, http://bai.org/bankingstrategies/2005-jan-feb/aml/ (noting the high costs
noted by banks); Daniel J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The Role of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 25 PACE L. REV. 219, 222-23 (2005) (discussing observers who peg the cost at $7
billion).
243.
See Mitchell, supra note 242, at 223 ("The key question, of course, is whether these
costs are matched by concomitant benefits. The answer almost certainly is no. As indicated in
the preceding paragraph, the government seizes very little dirty money.").
244.
See id. (observing that "there are only about 2,000 convictions for federal money
laundering offenses each year, and that number falls by more than 50 percent not counting
cases where money laundering was an add-on charge to another offense," and noting that
convictions had not increased (citing PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY
MONEY 108-13 (2004))).

245. See id. (citing Lucy Komisar, Offshore Banking: The Secret Threat to America, DISSENT,
Spring 2003, http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=505).
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moved to Afghanistan., 246 And Christina Jackson has observed that
"enforcement systems designed to unearth the large scale transfers used by
not as adept at identifying the
money launderers and drug traffickers are 247
'small routine transactions of terrorist cells."
The likelihood that these reporting requirements will help to catch a
terrorist is very low. As the 9/11 Commission staff explained, "For terrorist
financial transactions, the amount of money is often small or consistent with
the customer's profile (such as a charity raising money for humanitarian
aid) and the transactions seemingly innocuous. As a consequence, banks
generally are unable to separate suspicious from legitimate transactions. , 248
3.

Overdiscretion

The radical expansion of FinCEN's administrative scheme has created
new opportunities for the agency to impose penalties on financial
institutions that have failed to meet every jot and tittle of the new
requirements. Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering
number of fines on banks for failing to meet its reporting requirements.
249
ABN AMRO, a
Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large.
large European bank, has been hit with a $30 million fine (and more from
state regulators) 25°Western Union has also been hit with a $30 million fine
for its record-keeping failures. 25 ' And the Department ofJustice has brought
criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted

246.

9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH supra note 141, at 25.

247.

Jackson, supra note 232, at 161.

248. 9/11 COMMISSION TERRORIST FINANCING MONOGRAPH, supra note 141, at 52. Observers
agree: "[B]oth developed and less developed states may find it difficult to regulate some
financial transactions because substitute can be used to achieve them."). Cu6llar, supra note
155, at 20.
249. For a list of these fines, not all of which, of course, were related to terrorism, but a
great number of which were related to recordkeeping, see Aquilan, Anti-Money Laundering
Solutions, What Actions Has FinCEN Taken to Enforce the USA PATRIOT Act and Bank
(last
Secrecy Act?, http://www.aquilan.com/documents/Recent%20FinCEN%20Actions.pdf
visited May 10, 2007); Aaron R. Hutman, MatthewJ. Herrington, & EdwardJ. Krauland, Money
Laundering Enforcement and Policy, 39 INT'L LAW. 649 (2005) (noting significant enforcement

actions).
250. In the consent decree, ABN AMRO and the government agreed that "the New York
Branch of ABN AMRO filed incomplete or inaccurate suspicious activity reports." In the Matter
of the New York Branch ABN AMRO Bank N.Y., No 2005-5 (FinCEN Assessment of Civil Money
Penalty Dec. 19, 2005), at 7, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcment/
2005/20051219/1219attachment3.pdf; In the Matter of ABN AMRO Bank N.V. et al., FRB Dkt.
No 050035-CMP-FB (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board Order of Assessment of
a Civil Money Penalty (Dec. 19, 2005)), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
enforcement/2005/20051219/12905attachme nt2.pdf.
In the Matter of Western Union Financial Services, Inc. No 2003-02 (FinCEN
251.
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty with Undertakings Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.fincen.
gov/westernjunionassessment.pdf (assessing fines for, inter alia, failure to adequately file
suspicious activity reports).
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in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in
combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank
out of business.2' 2
The regulated industry, as one might imagine, has found the increased
level of fines to be troubling. It has accused FinCEN of assessing the fines
randomly and unpredictably and has sought more guidance from the agency
on how it decides to assess fines and why it makes them so large. 253 As with
OFAC, though, FinCEN has not been eager to limit its discretion to fine as it
wishes. 54
4.

Inexpertise

Although the Treasury Department has tried to prevent money
laundering for some time, we see two ways in which the new anti-terrorism
scheme has failed to make use of that expertise-even apart from the
question as to whether trying to prevent terrorists from laundering money
makes sense as a civil administrative scheme at all.
First, it is by no means clear that the government can handle all of this
new data. The recent intensification of the reporting regime has
overwhelmed the Treasury Department with paper. Some twelve-million
reports are filed on transactions over $10,000 every year. 255 As of June 30,

252. See In the Matter of AMSouth Bank, No. 2004-2 (FinCEN Assessment of Civil Money
Penalty
Oct.
12,
2004),
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2004/10/12/0000891836-04000358/Section9.asp (finding, among other things, that "AmSouth failed to develop an antimoney laundering program tailored to the risks of its business and reasonably designed, as
required by law, to prevent the Bank from being used to launder money and finance terrorist
activities and to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act"); John F.Cooney, The Hazards of
Enforcing Guidance, ADMIN.
L. & REG. NEWS, Winter 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.venable.com/docs/pubs/1428.pdf. The government's 2005 Money Laundering
Threat Assessment reported that "Riggs National Bank was fined over forty million dollars as a
consequence of serious deficiencies in its AML program, including in its private banking
practice," which included loans to "politically exposed persons, accepting millions of dollars in
deposits under various corporate and individual account names and paying little or no
attention to suspicious activity in these accounts." MONEY LAUNDERING TRADE ASSESSMENT
WORKING GROUP, U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT 13 (2005), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/js3077 01112005_MLTA.pdf; see also Timothy
O'Brien, RegulatorsFine Riggs $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at C1 ("The fine stems from
Riggs's failure over at least the last two years to actively monitor suspect financial transfers
through Saudi Arabian and Equatorial Guinean accounts held by the bank. The accounts are

still being scrutinized as possible conduits for terrorist funds or for the proceeds of graft.").
253.
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services and the Subcomm. on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the H. Comm. on

International Relations, 109th Cong. (May 4, 2005) (statement of John Byrne, Chairman,
American Bankers Ass'n) [hereinafter Byrne Testimony], available at http://www.aba.com/NR/
rdonlyres/CDA74BEE-3E41-42D4-B7EO-C32E94B32D07/39275/AMLTestimonyBMay2005.pdf.
254. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
255. Letter from Charlotte M Bahim, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, American
Community Bankers, to Jennifer Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (May 6, 2005), available at http://www.americascommunitybankers.com/government/
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2005, over 2.6 million Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") forms had been
256
filed with FinCEN. The suspicious activity reports that are the focus of the
post-PATRIOT Act regime have also exploded in number: "[Flilings in the
first six months of 2005 increased 45% over those filed in the same period of
2004" for depositary institutions alone. 7 "The volume of SAR filings in 2003
was 453% higher than those filed in 1996." 25 As the chair of the American
Bankers Association testified to Congress, banks filed 43,000 such reports
with OFAC in March 2005-a forty percent increase over the prior year.5 9
There is no indication that FinCEN, even a FinCEN that has expanded
precipitously since September 11, knows how to manage all of these
reports. 260 In fact, the former director of FinCEN complained in 2004 that
too many of these SARs were being filed by banks. 26' The haphazard nature
of the fines that FinCEN has imposed has led some observers to question
whether the agency has a policy in place to sort through each of the
reports. 262
Second, the broad scope of the new regulations suggests not an agency
applying old skills to new areas but an agency that may be engaged in
regulatory empire-building. FinCEN has not only imposed a broad new
laundry list of reporting requirements on financial institutions after
September 11, but it has also "encourage[d] further cooperation" among
financial institutions in preventing terrorists from laundering funds. The
complexity, detail, and public-private nature of the regulatory scheme has
expanded FinCEN's reach beyond its traditional regulatory purview. 261
scripts/governmentview comment.asp?ID=1142 ("Financial institutions have filed over 12
million CTRs [currency transaction reports] each year since 1995.").
256. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, United States Dep't of Treasury, 5 THE SAR
ACTIvTY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS Feb. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.fincen.gov/
sars/sarsby_numb-issue5.pdf.
257. Id.
258. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, United States Department of Treasury, 2 THE
SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS, May 2004, at 1, available at http://www.fincen.
gov/bythenumbersissue2.pdf.
259. Byrne Testimony, supra note 253.
260. As one banker has wondered, "We've got all of this data; how much actually led to
something? That's a question all of us have. After all this effort and all these resources, what
success have we had?" Annie Baxter, Personal Information Becomes Post-9/11 Target (Marketplace
public radio broadcast Sept. 8, 2006) (quoting Bill Patient, Compliance Officer of
BankCherokee of Minnesota), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2006/
09/08/PM200609086.html.
261.
See Hutman et al., supra note 249, at 654.
262. As one former FBI agent has stated, "You can be buried in an avalanche of
information.... The total volume of activity makes it very difficult to track and trace any type of
specific information."John Berlau, Show Us Your Money, REASON (Los Angeles), Nov. 2003, at 22
(quoting former FBI agent Oliver Revell).
263. Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar, Notice, Comment, and the Regulatory State: A Case Study from
the USA PATRIOT Act, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 3. As Cu6llar observed
elsewhere, "the rule is one that applies to virtually anyone in the country .... and.., the statute

SENDING THE BUREA UCRA CY TO WAR

1417

Finally, it is briefly worth noting that some observers question the
enterprise of tasking financiers with anti-terrorism responsibilities-a job in
which those being regulated are as inexperienced as the regulators. As Larry
Cunningham has noted, there is "reason to doubt whether the tools auditors
apply to old-fashioned financial statement audits work as well when applied
264
in" non-traditional exercises such as "thwart[ing] terrorist financing.
5.

The Impact on Proxies

The new administrative procedures designed to combat money
laundering are extraordinarily overbroad, requiring most money-related
businesses to implement a complex reporting scheme on almost all of their
income. In doing so, we see the problems of using civil administrative
process-which is best suited for broad rules of general applicability-to
root out terrorists uninterested in participating in an administrative scheme.
The banking industry has paid a heavy regulatory price to comply with an
administrative effort designed to identify the tiny-and possibly
nonexistent-number of terrorists who are customers of that industry.
Compliance with the reporting requirements of the regulations
demands millions of hours of bank-employee time, in addition to the hours
of government officials who go through filed reports. The question, as
always, remains whether the new regulations are likely to deter terrorists and
thus worth the costs. A KPMG survey revealed that ninety-four percent of
North American banks reported increased costs in complying with FinCEN's
rules, with "one-third of those respondents saying their costs have more than
doubled over the last three years. ,165
More generally, banking-industry representatives have complained that
different banking regulators inconsistently supervise compliance with these
266
and that the multiple regulators involved in the process make
programs

gives the agency a lot of latitude with the rule." Cudllar, supra note 155, at 32. In fact, the new
regulations selected by the agency are designed, in his view, to facilitate financial institutions'
disclosures of the accounts of people suspected of being involved in money laundering and
terrorist financing to the Treasury Department. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2002).
264.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud,
Terrorism, OtherIlls,29J. CORP. L. 267, 271 (2004).

265. Posting of Karen Epper Hoffman to Banking Strategies Blog, http://www.bai.org/
cs/blogs/bankingstrategiesnews/archive/2005/01/ 13/505.aspx (Jan 13, 2005, 9:14 AM).
266. Byrne Testimony, supra note 253. One banker has estimated that implementing the
new know-your-customer rules consume forty percent of his time. See Baxter, supra note 260
(quoting BankCherokee of Minnesota's compliance officer); The Needle in the Haystack,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=
1492146. The article notes:
[Blankers with long experience of financial crime say that many of the rules
introduced since September l1th to keep terrorists out of the mainstream

92 IOWA LA WREVIEW

1418

[2007]

267

for a complex regulatory regime. This imposes a substantial burden on
financial institutions, affecting their information systems, employee training,
and strategic planning for the future-including possible mergers and
acquisitions.
6.

Conclusion

The question is whether it makes sense to use a civil scheme to track
possible customers voluntarily under federal control of those institutions,
even if those customers have no interest in furthering the federal regulatory
scheme. This search for the needle in the haystack is a very costly one.
Relying on civil officials to handle this massive effort to smoke out
terrorists-who do not participate in high finance, at any rate-illustrates
the damage that can be inflicted by broad regulations that attempt to reach
the sort of people who would not comply anyway.
V.

QUALIFICATIONS TO THE ANALYSIS

We now turn to a number of potential objections to our analysis: (A)
that our blanket condemnation of civil administrative counterterrorism
would preclude some efficient and effective rules from being enacted (the
locked cockpit door rule objection); (B) that the substantial costs imposed
by terrorist incidents justify mobilizing the administrative state even if that
state is usually ineffective at identifying terrorists (the one-percent problem);
(C) that our claims about fit do not accurately characterize everything the
administrative state does (the organizational flexibility objection); and (D)
that one advantage of generally applicable rules is that they reduce the risk

financial system will not achieve their aim. And in the end, customers will pay
more for banking, because of the high cost of making detailed checks.
Id.

267. It is not only FinCEN that is involved in the new regulatory process. The federal
banking regulators (principally the Federal Reserve; the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), itself technically a part of Treasury; and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation) have imposed reporting requirements on their regulated industries pursuant to
the PATRIOT Act, as have the Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"), and National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). Per the stock
exchanges, all broker/dealers must implement an anti-money-laundering compliance program
and must file suspicious activity reports ("SARs") that identify and describe transactions that
raise suspicions of illegal activity. They also must establish certain procedures with regard to
"correspondent accounts" maintained for foreign banks. SeeJoseph, supra note 209, at 661.
As for the banking regulators, the ability of financial institutions to merge is at stake.
The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Federal Reserve Act and the Bank Merger Act to require
federal banking regulators to consider "the effectiveness of" the bank or thrift "in combating
money laundering activities, including in overseas branches" when the bank or thrift seeks to
merge with another financial institution. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c)(6), 1828(c)(11) (Supp. 2001).
In connection with any bank or thrift merger, the appropriate agency must consider "[t]he
effectiveness of any insured depository institution involved in the proposed merger transaction
in combating money laundering activities, including in overseas branches." Id. § 1828(c) (11).
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of racial profiling or other undesirable narrow casting of counterterrorism
efforts, while engaging many in a large government enterprise (the victory
garden objection).
A.

THE LOCKED CocKP1TDOOR OBjEcTIoN

It is probably the case that among the vast variety of actions that the civil
administrative state might take, some might deter terrorists and do so
effectively. Our claim is not that it never makes sense to use the civil
bureaucracy to combat terror-just that it almost never makes sense. We
acknowledge, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA")
rule requiring airlines to lock their cockpit doors so that passengers cannot
get in during flight. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, passed
shortly after September 11, authorized the FAA to require reinforced,
locked cockpit doors during flight on both domestic and international
flights."" The agency duly passed a rule requiring the locked doors, noting
11, 2001, terrorist
that it was being enacted "in the wake of the September
269
attacks against four U.S. commercial airplanes.
The FAA rule was one of general applicability, civil in nature, and may
be a good idea. In fact, locked cabin doors might have prevented terrorists
from reaching the cockpits of the planes they hijacked on September 11.270
The FAA rule is thus the perfect example, so the argument goes, of using an
ordinary agency to carry out an effective and efficient counterterrorism
policy, and hence also the perfect counterexample to our claims.
We think that the cockpit door rule supports, rather than refutes, our
argument, for we do not make the sweeping claim that no agency action can
ever be effective against terrorism. To the contrary, the FAA rule is an
example of that rare agency action that may be able to pass our three tests of
fit, balance between discretion and oversight, and expertise. Rather than
targeting a proxy group, the rule directly targets terrorists, who must be
among the few who would attempt to illicitly open a cockpit door during
flight. The new rule does not grant sweeping new powers to the agency nor
change the overall balance between discretion and oversight in its
procedures. Finally, rather than requiring the FAA to do something outside
its area of expertise and beyond its ordinary goals and mandate, this rule

268.

See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 104, 115 Stat. 606 (2001). Section 104 required the

administrator of the agency to regulate access to cockpits-if it was not already apparent that
the agency had the requisite authority from its broad power to regulate the airplane industry to
ensure flight safety.
269. Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs, 67 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2112 (Jan. 15,
2002).
270. See, e.g., Brian R. Wahlquist, Slamming the Door on Terrorists and the Drug Trade While
IncreasingLegal Immigration: Temporary Deployment of the United States Military at the Borders, 19 GEO.

IMMIGR. L.J. 551, 582 (2005) ("[Dlespite multiple hijackings of commercial airliners over the
past few decades, little was done to reinforce cockpit doors until after September 11.").
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called on the FAA to act within its expertise in overseeing airline standards
and plane safety. Accordingly, because the tests of fit, discretion, and
expertise are met, one would expect that the FAA rule might be an effective
counterterrorism measure-or at least one that is not likely to undermine
the agency's core mission.
It may, of course, be possible to conceive of other examples where civil
administrative regulations can be designed to remedy the problems of fit,
overdeference, and inexpertise, and where the burden on the public at large
(in the case of the cockpit door rule, a burden on airlines to install locks and
ensure that they are used) might be worth the cost of deterrence.
When this is the case, we are all for it. However, we do not think that
there will be many examples of this sort of judicious use of civil
administrative agencies. Our claim is a descriptive one, and thus may be
tested empirically. Comprehensively doing so is beyond the scope of this
Article, but we think that evaluations of every aspect of the civil
bureaucracy's counterterrorism initiatives would reveal that the vast majority
of them do not work-and we have offered a theory about why that might be
the case.
B.

THE ONE-PERCENTPROBLEM

The Vice President has suggested that the calamitous, if remote, risk of
271
a major terrorist attack justifies high investments in the war on terror.
272
Some call this the one-percent doctrine, and the idea for our purposes is
that the one in one hundred risk of attack justifies the mobilization of civil
administrative agencies to combat terrorism and the imposition of
substantial burdens on non-terrorists because it is possible that this
mobilization will prevent catastrophe.
It is of course possible to imagine a terrorist strike so horrific that
almost any cost is worth paying to prevent it-so long, of course, as paying
that cost will actually prevent the attack. But it is not at all clear that calling
upon the civil bureaucracy to join the fight against terrorists will prevent
future attacks or even measurably reduce the risk of attack, based on what
we have seen so far. The false positives have been high, the expenses great,
and the inefficiencies many. (The balance of effectiveness and efficiencies in
271.

The vice president identified this problem in
November of 2001 when [he was] confronted with harrowing intelligence about
Pakistani nuclear scientists sitting with (Osama) bin Laden .... The vice president

[said] that we need to think about these low-probability, high-impact events in a
different way . . . [that] [i]f there is a one percent chance that WMDs essentially
have been given to terrorists, we need to treat it as a certainty.
Bill Glauber, Q&A: Suskind on How Analysis and Action Split, MILWAUKEEJ. & SENTINEL, July 16,
2006, at 1 (quoting Ron Suskind).
272.
See generally RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE (2006) (documenting the
administration's use of the one-percent policy).
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the non-civil law enforcement context may be different, and we do not
pretend to assess those costs here.) But the one-percent argument assumes
that the government's bureaucratic counterterrorism initiatives will in fact
be effective in preventing, or at least reducing the risk of, terrorism. And
that is exactly the point that we contest.
By the same token, a one-percent assessment of the spectre of a terrorist
attack in the United States seems far out of proportion to the frequency of
the attacks that the country has actually experienced. Of course, this
forecasting problem is one that may also be tested empirically, and we do
not claim to do so in this Article. We would have hoped that our
government, in making this argument in defense of its initiatives, would
have felt compelled itself to provide some data in support of such sweeping
claims. But in the absence of any evidence about the likelihood of future
attacks, we think that while the specter of a terrorist attack may loom large, it
is hardly an everyday occurrence. In such a setting, it is unlikely that the civil
costs incurred by the repurposing of agencies towards fighting terror are
worth it.
C.

THE AGENCIES-CAN-DO-ANYTHING PROBLEM

We have characterized civil administration as a form of governance best
suited to rules of general applicability and the regulation of volunteers. In
doing so, we admit that we are painting with a broad brush; we make no
claim that there is a Platonic ideal of an agency and that it necessarily
involves rulemakings and adjudications of volunteers. It may be that at least
some agencies can flexibly be reformed to handle atypical or idiosyncratic
regulatory problems.273 The problem is that they are not being so reformed,
as exemplified by the examples we have given here. As with the cockpit door
objection, our response to the organizational flexibility argument is twofold.
Here too we willingly qualify our claim: agencies are rarely good at
fighting terrorism. We will not rule out the possibility that our civil
bureaucratic agencies can be efficiently and successfully reformed to
perform new terrorism-related tasks outside their areas of expertise,
although we think that will only very rarely be the case. But, as with the
cockpit door objections, in the rare cases that agencies can be efficiently
reformed to perform counterterrorism related tasks in a way that will meet
our three tests of fit, balance between discretion and oversight, and
expertise, we are all for it.
Here, we suggest that perhaps the crucial test is that of expertise.
Lawmakers might be able to find ways to enable a given civil agency to target
terrorists rather than proxy groups and to strike an adequate balance
between discretion and oversight. But for most counterterrorism tasks,

273.

For one approach on how this might be done, see generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles

F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocraticExperimentalism,98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
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expertise will be more readily found in agencies and amongst officials that
deal with criminal matters or law enforcement, such as intelligence analysts
and criminal investigators, rather than amongst bureaucratic officials like
bank regulators and DMV employees. Here, as with the other objections, if
we take the importance of expertise, fit, and adequate supervision seriously,
we suspect that only a very few proposed reforms will meet these tests.
D. THE VICTORY GARDEN PROBLEM

The imposition of burdens on everyone in the war on terror is not
wholly without appeal. Making all Americans suffer a bit more when they
renew their drivers' licenses may help to unify the country behind an antiterrorism policy and to reassure a worried public that something tangible is
being done to prevent terrorism. It may activate a populace in the same way
that victory gardens 274 and war bonds 275 have done in wars past-by
convincing everyone that their subjection to administrative process at least
means that they are doing their bit. Moreover, spreading the costs around
reduces the likelihood of a particularly ugly cost of targeted
counterterrorism: racial profiling.
We find the victory garden upside of sending the administrative state to
war to be uncompelling. The psychological advantage of appearing to have
done something, however ineffective, is not at all clear. As anyone who has
ever chatted with their neighbor in an airport security line can attest, the
American public is not so foolish as to be unable to distinguish potentially
useful from hopelessly ineffective security measures, and it gets little
satisfaction from participation in the latter. Victory garden proponents will
look hard, in our view, to find any evidence that levels of American
patriotism have received a boost from longer DMV lines.
Furthermore, while the risks of profiling in a more targeted war against
terror are real, 276 there are other ways of targeting counterterrorism
measures besides racial profiling. In particular, the inexpertise and
overdiscretion problems we have identified do not lend themselves to
resolution through profiling. Likewise, our proposals for change, such as the
suggestion that security in the political process might be better served by
improving FBI security checks than changing legal standards, do not rely on
profiling measures.

274. For an overview, see LEWIS A. ERENBERG & SUSAN HIRSCH, THE WAR IN AMERICAN
CULTURE: SOCIETY AND CONSCIOUSNESS DURING WORLD WAR II, at 17 (1996).
275. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY CRESCENZI, THE STRATEGIC BOND INVESTOR 18 (2002) ("War bonds
were crucial not only for the role they played in financing the war but in the way they helped
unify the nation. The sale of war bonds became a rallying cry.").
276.
See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REv.
1201, 1201 (2004) ("[C]ommentators continue to debate the fairness of the widespread
detention, deportation, and prosecution of Arabs and Muslims for non-terrorism related
offenses. That debate has focused partly on the issue of racial profiling.").
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As for fit, the broad sweep and general applicability of the measures we
have discussed here do not preclude the risk of racial profiling in
enforcement. Under the new REAL ID Act mandates, for example, whose
documents will be scrutinized more carefully by DMV employees, and which
asylum applicants' credibility will be questioned by USCIS decision-makers?
After all, the traffic laws are also rules that apply to the public at large, but
police officers' decisions concerning whom to pull over, ticket, and search
are notoriously tied to profiling.2 77 Furthermore, racial profiling itself is
subject to our criticism of fit as well. Precious few amongst the ethnic and
religious minorities typically targeted for counterterrorism investigation in
fact have links to terrorism, making racial profiling a similarly inefficient
screening mechanism to the others we have identified here.
Moreover, the pretense of effective action that a civil administrative war
on terror or a well-tended victory garden represents is hardly cost-free.
Actions that do nothing to win a war may crowd out other actions that might
work in a government scheme with scarce bureaucratic resources. And at
any rate, the real costs imposed on proxies like financial institutions,
charities, or people who would like to obtain asylum or drivers' licenses, in
our view, exceed the intangible benefits of making people feel like
something is being done.
In the end, we think the match of criminal-style law enforcement efforts
to deal with the criminal-like law-evading efforts of potential terrorists better
uses the potential of government action (and promises the test of criminal
process at the end of the government action) than does the imposition of
broad costs on everyone by mobilizing unconventional terrorism fighters in
the bureaucracy.
VI. CONCLUSION

Administrative agencies like the Treasury Department have been unfit,
inexpert, and unsupervised in their efforts to detect and deter terrorists
under the PATRIOT Act, and the new measures introduced by the REAL ID
Act are likely only to make matters worse by pushing more of our unrelated
civil agencies into the fray. Indeed, the agencies we study in detail are hardly
alone in developing expensive new anti-terrorism policies.
The FDA, for example, has joined them. 278 It is, according to a
commissioner, "applying... more resources to counterterrorism in all areas

277.
See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999).
278.

James T. O'Reilly, Bombing BureaucraticComplacency: Effects of Counter-TerrorismPressures

upon Medical Product Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 331 (2004) ("[T]he Food &
Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDCP) . . . [are each] large and complex public health
bureaucrac[ies] and each has served a distinct, though interrelated, role in the war on
terrorism."); Otesa Middleton, EDA Grows to Counter Challenges of Terrorism, WALL ST.J., Sept. 11,
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including the development of a new "Project Bioshield

280

and the fast-tracking of an anti-terrorism vaccine approval process. 2 l The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") advises
employers on how best to defend against chemical , 2 biological,
and
radiation 2 84 terrorism, and it requires them to address terrorist emergencies
through its emergency response program. 215 The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"), a rate regulator, has limited access to its
documents286 and, pursuant to a new statute, set new rules for the

2002, available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/fdagrows.html ("Since last year's terror
and anthrax attacks, the Food and Drug Administration's staff has swelled to record levels...
[including] a staff of 10,389, a 10% increase.").
279. Michelle Meadows, The FDA and the Fight Against Terrorism, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Jan.Feb. 2004, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/104_terror.html. The FDA's
increased efforts generally have focused on "two defensive measures: preventing willful
contamination of all regulated goods; and increasing the availability of medical products to
prevent or treat injuries caused by biological, chemical, or nuclear agents." Lester Crawford, Jr.
D.V.M., Ph.D., Prepared Remarks, The Food and Drug Law Institute's 45th Annual Educational
Conference Keynote Addresses, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 231 (2002). "
280. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835. Project BioShield has
three main measures: providing the NIH with new authorities to speed research and
development in areas of medical countermeasure development; authorizing the use of
unapproved medical products during emergencies; and mandating the government to maintain
a stockpile of vaccines and other medical products to provide for the health security of the
United States in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other emergency. Id. §§ 2-4.
281.
As the FDA noted when it rapidly approved a child dose of an antidote for nerve-gas
exposure, the agency "has placed a high priority in making available safe and effective
countermeasures against potential terrorist attacks." Michael D. Greenberg, Information,
Paternalism, and Rational Decision-Making: The Balance of FDA New Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L.J. SCi.
& TECH. 663, 667-68 (2003) ("Concerns about terrorism are pressing a new set of regulatory
reforms at the FDA, designed to speed the development pipeline for new products important to
national security, and in recognition that such products may be formally untestable under the
traditional FDA new product approval regime."); O'Reilly, supra note 278, at 332 (quoting Press
Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Pediatric Doses of Atropen (Jan. 30, 2003),
availableat http//fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANSO1232.html).
282. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Safety & Health Topics, Chemical Terrorism, http://www.osha.
gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/chemicalsub.html (last visitedJan. 25, 2007).
283. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emergency Preparedness-Biological, http://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/emergencypreparedness/biological-sub.html (last visitedJan. 25, 2007).
284. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emergency Preparedness-Radiation, http://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/emergencypreparedness/radiationsub.html (last visitedJan. 25, 2007).
285. Employee Emergency Plans & Fire Prevention Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.38 (2006).
286. Specifically, the FERC removed from the public viewing certain documents, such as
oversized maps that detail the specifications of energy facilities licensed or certificated under
Part I of the Federal Power Act, and § 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act. See Comm'n Opinions,
Orders & Notices, Treatment of Previously Discovered Documents, 97 FERC 61,030 (Oct. 11,
2001), available at 2001 WL 1522251; see also Patricia McDermott, Withhold and Control:
Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 684-85 (2003) (discussing
FERC limiting access to information post-September 11).
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distribution of gas and oil-again, all in the name of the war on terror.
Even the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
has gotten into the anti-terrorism game. Pursuant to the Church Arson
Prevention Act of 1996, HUD now guarantees loans made by financial
institutions to assist § 501(c)(3) nonprofits that have been damaged as a
result of arson-or terrorism.289
And these new initiatives are only part of the story. Although the new
Department of Homeland Security has three primary missions-"prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do
occur,"29°-DHS

has

extended

its

terror-fighting

mandate

to

anti-

counterfeiting measures, 291 the Safe School Initiative, 292) and the regulation

287. Interagency Agreement Among the Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, U.S. Coast
Guard, & Research, and Special Programs Admin. for the Safety and Security Review of
Waterfront Import/Export Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://
www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/2004-interagency.pdf
(addressing
FREC's
regulatory authority). The FERC signed an interagency agreement with various agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, to share information and analyses to jointly
prepare Environmental impact Statements ("EIS") and safety reports for all LNG terminals. Id.;
see generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, A GUIDE TO LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: WHAT ALL
CITIZENS SHOULD KNOW (2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/

citz-guide-lng.pdf.
288. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Comm'r Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Address to the
Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Symposium, Address at the Duke Envtl. Law &
Policy Forum Symposium (Nov. 19, 2004), in 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 251, 256 (2004)
(noting that the biggest issue that has come to light in the last year and a half since LNG activity
has been progressing at FERC has been concern about terrorism on tankers and discussing how
the Coast Guard actually has jurisdiction over the tankers); Report of the Natural Gas Regulation
Committee, 25 ENERGY L.J. 217, 224-27 (2004) (discussing FERC's plan to protect the energy
infrastructure in the wake of September 11); Report of the Natural Gas Regulation Committee, 26

ENERGY L. J. 259, 275-76 (2005) (discussing FERC activity regarding measures enacted to
protect the critical energy infrastructure); Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law out of the Deference Trap in

Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 617, 669 (2005) (suggesting that concerns over the
relationship between terrorism and oil led to Congress's failed energy bill in 2003).
289. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Section II: Assisted Housing, http://www.hud.
gov/sec2.cfm (last visitedJan. 25, 2007).
290.

SECURING OUR HOMELAND: U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 3

(2004), availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSStratPlanFINAL-spead.pdf.
291. As the Congressional Research Service has said,
[A]nother matter extends to the capability of the Secret Service to maintain its
traditional role in the enforcement of certain financial crimes, such as anticounterfeiting. Such criminal conduct has also become more sophisticated and
complex. And combating it may now have to compete with new higher priorities and
expanded duties in other fields, most markedly in anti-terrorism.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT: FY2006 APPROPRIATIONS 40 (2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32863.pdf.
292. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Threats and Protections: Children and Schools,
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=75 (last visitedJan. 25, 2007).
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of telemarketing.9 3 State and local governments have also been pressed into
service in the anti-terrorism cause on both immigration2 4 and other
matters. 295
Civil administrators should be encouraged to lay down their arms in the
war on terror, pick up their collective bureaucratic pens, and turn back to
the tasks they were intended to perform. For as we have seen, when these
agencies pursue terrorists instead of developing their areas of expertise,
proxies-and ultimately, all of us-pay the price of the errors that inevitably
ensue.
Of course, this does not mean that we should give up on fighting
terrorists. Counterterrorism policies could be directed through traditional
military, law enforcement, and intelligence mechanisms. They could also be
directed through new, specialized anti-terrorism agencies that operate
differently than traditional civil regulators, much as specialized agencies like
the Department of Defense execute conventional wars. Concerns regarding
the ultimate value of the war on terrorism and the precise approach that
these task-specific and rationalized government actors should take in their
anti-terrorism initiatives are, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, we have focused on a different, narrower question: Should antiterrorism measures be channeled through our ordinary administrative
agencies? We think that, generally, the answer is no. Involving administrative
agencies in this war serves only symbolic goals (and arguably not even
those), and it does so at a substantial financial and social cost. The
PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act reforms cut against the cogent analysis of
Weber, the legal process, and New Deal administrative law scholars, who
urged delegation of authority to agencies only in accordance with their
expertise and with an eye to balancing agency discretion with external
oversight. They also contradict our basic notion of fit: that civil rules based
in voluntary participation and compliance can best be used to regulate the
law-abiding public rather than non-civil actors who will not hesitate to
circumvent and thwart these systems.
But we cannot ignore reality: our government has left us no doubt that
it views the war on terror as proceeding on all fronts, domestic and
international, through the military, through law enforcement, and through

293. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge Announces New
Financial Investigation Initiatives (July 8, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
releases/press-releases_0206.shtm.
294. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 112, at 81. Some cities, including New York,
have traditionally refused to share information with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, formally the INS, on the immigration status of their citizenry. Id. at 475 n.46.
295. The federal government's Terrorist Information and Prevention System suggests novel
uses of the federal Militia Clause power, including the new prospect of disciplining local
counterparts that have refused to cooperate in the effort to quash terrorism. Gil Grantmore,
The Phages ofAmerican Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 455, 472 (2003).
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these theseordinry
ordinary agencies.
Realistically, therefore, we feel compelled to
answer the "what then" question-what if, in spite of the concerns we have
raised here, anti-terrorism measures will nonetheless be directed through
administrative agencies, for reasons of political expediency, public demand,
or symbolic significance? In our view, if anti-terrorism measures must be
directed through administrative agencies, the least that we can do is to try to
minimize the collateral damage such measures cause to our agencies, to
proxies, and to the American people.
The most effective way of doing so would be to ensure that those
measures are good policy anyway-that is, that they would be good policy
even without the national security purpose that is catalyzing their immediate
implementation. To meet the "good policy anyway" test, at a minimum, such
measures should observe three principles: they should fit within the core
competence of the agency, properly balance discretion with oversight, and
perhaps most importantly, promote some end that furthers the agency's
regulatory responsibilities."'
The drivers' license measures called for by the REAL ID Act provide a
good example of how current anti-terrorism measures could be amended to
be "good policy anyway." Whether an initiative promotes the agency's
purpose should be considered according to two concerns: the substance of
the provision and a cost-benefit analysis of the extent to which the provision
promotes a core goal in light of the resources it directs away from other
agency goals. Here, sharing databases of driver records and automobile
registrations with other states enables DMVs to more accurately enforce
driver and automobile safety across state lines. This measure also seems
likely to promote this core agency goal efficiently, without redirecting too
many resources from other agency initiatives, for it builds from and
reinforces existing databases and ongoing synchronization efforts in the
states.
In contrast, confirming social security numbers and immigration status
are directly counterproductive measures that discourage some residents,
particularly illegal immigrants, from participating in the licensing regime.
Finally, because other measures aimed at making the cards difficult to forge,
confirming identity, and reducing identity fraud promote the core goal of
automobile and driver safety only indirectly, the effect such measures will
have on DMVs' resources and functions is crucial: very inexpensive measures

296. Terrorism financing is "A Key Front in a Global War on Terror" as Treasury officials
have testified to Congress, and the slogan warranted inclusion in the president's State of the
Union address. Levey Testimony, supra note 217. Congressman James Sensenbrenner has
declared that "[t]he Real ID [Act] is vital to preventing foreign terrorists from hiding in plain
sight while conducting their operations and planning attacks." Dibya Sarkar, REAL ID Zips
Through Congress, FCW.cOM, May 11, 2005, http://www.fcw.com/article88832-05-11-05-Web.
297. These principles, of course, build on our previous discussion of the core
administrative-law concepts of expertise and discretion. See infta Part II.A.
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may nonetheless be worthwhile for their indirect effects, but very costly
measures like maintaining databases of identity documents will probably
direct too many resources away from the agency's core purposes.
It is perhaps not surprising that there seems to be a connection between
the goals that are within the core purpose of the agency and the tasks that
are within its expertise. Here, activities that undermine the DMV's purpose
also tend to be outside its expertise, such as checking immigration
documents and reviewing social security numbers, as well as checking and
maintaining databases of identity documents. Once again, maintaining and
sharing driver and automobile records form a notable exception, being well
within the agency's area of expertise.
Ultimately, although the "good policy anyway" test provides a way for
the government to implement some counterterrorism measures through our
civil administrative systems, if it must, our view is that the civil bureaucracy is
not the right place to center the war on terrorism. Instead, our
administrative agencies should be left to manage the occasionally boring,
but ultimately crucial, matters that they handle best.

